


JPRS Report

Soviet Union

International Affairs



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Soviet Union

International Affairs

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Supreme Soviet Committee Chairman on Foreign Ties

91UN2065C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Jun 91 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations, by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Yuriy Kashin; place and date not given: "Two Aspects of Foreign Policy"]

[Text] Russia is increasingly opening its window on the world. How should the foreign policy of the Russian state be shaped under the conditions of its sovereignty, and what should be its priorities? A ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent talked about this with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations.

[Lukin] Our committee is a parliamentary body designed to shape conceptually the international aspects of Russia's activity. The RSFSR is part of the Union and part of the world community. The international activity of Russia as part of the Union begins outside the Russian borders. This means that Russia's foreign policy has two aspects. The first is its relations with the republics within our Union, the second is relations with conventional foreign states. People who are quite conservative in their thinking sometimes ask this question: How is it possible to talk about international activity under the conditions of the Union? As far as the USSR is concerned, interrepublic relations are not foreign relations for Union activity to the extent that the republics are part of the Union. But for each republic, relations outside its borders are foreign relations. There is nothing special in this. All the agreements that are concluded with the republics, in particular the agreements signed with the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova, are undoubtedly Russian foreign ties. It is another matter that these are specific foreign ties, and that is how we regard them. The activity of our committee is active participation in these ties. I think that we have been able to achieve something here. Under conditions in which the Union finds itself in a complicated transitional stage, and some people even think that it is disintegrating, some kind of guarantees in relations with neighbors are absolutely essential. Both general political relations and related ones-that large numbers of Russians live outside Russia's borders, and also that economic ties have become so permanent in nature that they can be broken only at the cost of flesh and blood. All of this makes framework agreements on the principles of relations urgent. Our committee has been addressing this literally from the first days of its creation.

[Kashin] It was obviously not easy for you to start this activity from a standing start, so to speak.

[Lukin] It really was from a standing start. The only precedents were those between 1917 and 1925, and they were not very solid or stable. Now we have our own serious work to do, and our skills are improving from

one treaty to the next, and I suggest that ultimately we shall have the kinds of agreements that as a supplement to the Union treaty will ensure for Russia a normal existence, and for citizens, regardless of nationality, guarantees for protection of their rights in the republics. There are complex problems here: The borders were established rather arbitrarily and there are difficulties with respect to the relationship of citizenship in any particular republic vis-a-vis rigorous observance of all rights—economic, social, and political. Our position here is very clear: We are for the priority of the rights of the individual over the rights of nations. I am deeply convinced that the philosopher who said that truth is dearer than motherland was right, and that the contrary thesis-that the motherland is dearer than the truthleads directly to fascism, to the situation of "my country, right or wrong." Unfortunately it has to be said that in our republics that make up the traditional Union there are people and political figures who believe otherwise. They also include those who call themselves defenders of European and other human rights. But I think that time will show the relationship between patriotism just for show and the real desire to become a civilized country. Of course, there should be no diktat here from Russia. People often ask us why we do not intervene in some particular conflict in the Transcaucasus, why we do not react to it. This occurs because sometimes everyone confuses the Union and Russia.

[Kashin] The second part of the committee's activity has to do with conventional international affairs. How is the work being done on this plane?

[Lukin] Right from the start we determined clearly not to replace Union foreign policy or be some kind of alternative. That would be incorrect. If it states in the Declaration on Sovereignty that the RSFSR is part of the Union, then it would be lacking in seriousness to act as an ugly duckling in this crucial international matter. Attempts of this kind that have sometimes been made at some incomprehensible level never bring honor. Imagine that at the strategic arms negotiations, for example, the governor of California or a representative from one of the Canadian provinces turned up and said: What you are asserting here is lacking in seriousness, just listen to what I have to say. This would not make any serious impression on any of the representatives of the world community, to put it mildly.

Right from the start the committee has taken the following position: Russia is a great European state and it should show its face in the world. If it is part of the Union then it must show its face as part of it and not compete with it. At the same time we should oppose trends in the Union leadership that we regard as negative and conservative, and here we should stand firm. As far as foreign policy is concerned, since 1985 we have considered that most of it has been positive. We have therefore supported and still support the bases of foreign policy activity by the Union leadership, but naturally we do have our own interests here that we should defend

more actively and present to the world, both together with the Union and directly.

Now about the specifics of our Russian foreign policy relations with neighboring countries. They undoubtedly do exist. What relations? I would put it thus: Whereas the main geopolitical interest of the Union is Europe, with the Asian-Pacific region in second place, for Russia they are of equal importance. Russia borders on the east with the world's greatest countries—China, the United States, Japan. We shall establish links with the countries of East Europe because objectively they are our priority zone. In general, the relations between the Russian parliament and the Russian leadership and East Europe do not involve the complexes that were enrooted against the imperial diktat. On the other hand, they fear the collapse of the Union because they understand that this factor should be stable, in their own interests.

We intend to develop our participation in international organizations. Agreement has been reached with the Union leadership that Russia will play a more active role in the United Nations and that our representative will be part of the Soviet delegation. As far as Asia is concerned, our Russian group recently participated in the president's trip to Japan. I say in jest that of the two sides, the most positive result there was achieved by the third. The joint Soviet-Japanese communique included a point stating that Russia will play a special role in Soviet-Japanese relations, and this will open up for us a legal route for recognition both by the Union and by Japan of our right to cooperate actively with this, our neighbor in problems of mutual interest.

MGIMO Rector on Institute's Changes

91UF0961A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 91 First edition p 3

[A.I.Stepanov, rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations interviewed by S. Cheremin; place and date not given: "Without the Secret Stamp"]

[Text] It seems just a short time ago in one of the presentations of the KVN [Expansion not given] programs students of the MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations] staged the following parody. An American intelligence agent receives an assignment to uncover a supersecret Soviet higher educational establishment. Finding himself in Moscow the spy goes through mountains of directories and studies agency data but all attempts to track down the mysterious institute prove to be futile. In utter despair he wanders the streets and suddenly a breeze from the southwest delivers the scent of the finest perfumes, the purring of luxury limousine engines. In short all that is enticing about "the good life" on the other side of the border. "MGIMO is somewhere over there!" the spy exclaims with joy and dashes over to the southwest of the capital.

In the epoch before perestroika this joke contained a share of bitter truth. The Moscow State Institute of International Relations tried not to "shine." But the changes of recent years affected it as well. At present, with the assistance of the Association of Young Journalists, its leadership willingly and eagerly communicates with the press discussing the most pressing problems. And so, today's "Dialog" guest - Rector of the institute, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor A.I. Stepanov.

[Cheremin] Andrey Ivanovich, today we are witnessing an acute political struggle, including one within the educational system. Formerly MGIMO was considered a political higher educational establishment and enrollment in it was possible only for members of the CPSU and VLKSM [All-Union Lenin Young Communist League]. Has anything changed in that sphere?

[Stepanov] I believe that the institute must not be a toy in the political struggle of various parties. Our principal task is the training of highly skilled personnel, people of culture who are well educated, true citizens and patriots of their country. We would like to inculcate the graduates with a spirit of patriotism that was cultivated in Russia over the centuries.

In the new situation the role of the party organization, of course, has changed. It lost personnel and control functions. The party organization has ceased meddling in the educational process. But the other extreme—total disregard of the opinion of communists, should also be avoided. After all, there are almost 1,500 of them at the institute today.

The party committee along with the trade union committee and the council of veterans merely extend administrative assistance and issue recommendations. Therefore it is simply unwise and dumb to initiate a campaign to banish it from the institute, as it is being done at some of the higher educational establishments. The general tendency is the formation of any party organizations in the future on the basis of the territorial principle. I believe that in time we as well will arrive at such a resolution, but at the present it is better not to force the events.

[Cheremin] Nevertheless in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the advantage when departing, for instance, on diplomatic assignments, belongs to CPSU members. Does this contradict the fact that you accept for training individuals with different political views?

[Stepanov] It is true that in order to enroll in the MGIMO today it is not necessary to be a member of the VLKSM or the CPSU. Consequently we also recommend the graduates for jobs proceeding primarily from their professional qualities.

[Cheremin] Just as many other institutes in the country MGIMO is actively entering into market relations.

[Stepanov] In accordance with the plan this year we are admitting 330 persons for the first-year course. The rector's office, however, decided to admit 62 additional applicants. Enterprises and organizations sending these people to us must transfer 75,000 rubles to the institute

per person. These funds are used to provide classrooms with modern equipment and for payments to students and instructors. After all, today, in order to retain a highly qualified specialist it is necessary to pay him well. The school of business, cost accounting subdivisions, and small enterprises make a substantive contribution to the budget.

[Sheremin] Do quotas exist for admission of certain categories of citizens as it was earlier?

[Stepanov] The institute eliminated all quotas. We accept applications from all regardless of whether they are children of kolkhoz members or diplomats, workers, or reserve military personnel. We strive to create conditions for an honest and open competition. The only case in which we provide special treatment is when we see gifted individuals. For example during an examination an applicant displays good knowledge of a language but his pronunciation is poor. It turns out that this person studied at a rural school. How can one avoid helping in such a case!

It is necessary to take into account that children are placed under unequal conditions from the very start. Some are destined to live for many years abroad with their parents, while someone else grows up in a remote provincial town. That is why our task is not just to simply evaluate the level of preparation but to reveal true gifts.

[Cheremin] Does the institute have contacts with similar educational establishments in other countries? I am not asking this question by chance since I seem to recall that formerly contacts with foreigners were not welcomed and students even had to vouch in writing that they would avoid meetings with them.

[Stepanov] This anachronism is long past. The modern higher educational establishment cannot develop if there are no student and teacher exchanges along with mutual enrichment with experience, information, and ideas. Recently we established business contacts with a number of educational and scientific centers in the USA, Canada, France, Italy, the Chinese People's Republic, FRG, Japan, South Korea and other countries. Many foreigners are undergoing qualification apprenticeship and the educational course at MGIMO. By the way, payment for some of them is collected in convertible currency.

Yanayev on CSCE Human Dimension Conference 91UF0960B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jul 91 Union edition p 3

[USSR Vice President Yanayev Interviewed by Izvestiya; place and date not given: "Toward a New Europe"]

[Text]The SBSE [Commission on Security and Cooperation of Europe] Conference on human dimension will open in Moscow on 10 September. At the request of Izvestiya the Vice President of the USSR G. N. Yanayev talks about preparations for it.

First of all, he stated, I would like to remind that the Moscow humanitarian conference is taking place in accordance with the final document of the Vienna meeting of CSCE member states. The Moscow conference is the culminating stage of a three-stage cycle of the CSCE Conference on Human Dimension. The first conference took place in 1989 in Paris and the second one was in Copenhagen in 1990. All three conferences are linked by a unified agenda.

In accordance with the mandate adopted at the Vienna meeting the Moscow conference will focus on three types of questions: progress in the fulfillment of international obligations by participating states in the field of human rights and the humanitarian sphere, results produced by the functioning of the CSCE human dimension mechanism created in Vienna, and ways of expanding general European humanitarian collaboration.

The Moscow conference may become an important stage on the road to development of the general European process and the elaboration of unified standards in the sphere of human rights within the CSCE framework along with common approaches to the resolution of questions concerning humanitarian cooperation. The Soviet leadership, President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev, attaches considerable significance to preparatory measures for the Moscow conference and to its conduct.

On orders from the head of state a commission was created for preparation for the Moscow humanitarian forum. The vice president was charged with the task of heading it. The commission includes representatives of state organs, ministries, and agencies as well as political and public figures. Various cultural, legal defense, and other movements supporting the goals and principles underlying the creation of a unified and democratic Europe are also represented in it.

The resolution of practical tasks was delegated to the executive secretariat. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. F. Petrovskiy was appointed executive secretary of the Moscow conference with the agreement of all governments of the participating states. The executive secretariat strives to ensure normal conditions for fruitful work by delegations and assure a high

standard of technical support and servicing. The House of Unions and the Moskva Hotel complex will be the site of the Moscow conference.

Preparation for the Moscow conference also developed in other CSCE member countries which attach considerable significance to it. This is evidenced in particular by the positive reaction to the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to his colleagues to take part in the opening of the conference.

[Izvestiya] How do you envisage the contribution of the Soviet side to the Moscow humanitarian forum?

[Yanayev] The success of the Moscow forum is desired by all inasmuch as the need to consolidate the institution of human rights as the foundation of the democratic state is felt throughout. The process of democratization in all spheres of the life of society in the Soviet Union as well as the formation of a legal government and creation of conditions for free harmonious development of the individual permit us to occupy an active position at the conference.

We proceed from the fact that a constructive dialogue must take place at the meeting with an accent on the guarantee of political pluralism of states belonging to CSCE, the position of national minorities and indigenous peoples as well as migration. I hope that important ideas will also be heard concerning the independence and self-determination of the individual including intellectual freedom in the broad sense of that concept.

It is probably time to agree on higher standards within the CSCE framework for the protection of the rights and interests of vulnerable groups—children, women, invalids, and the elderly. In other words, the direction in which the further development of humanitarian cooperation within the CSCE framework will proceed depends on the success of the Moscow conference.

[Izvestiya] As far as it is known various public measures will take place along with the official part of the Moscow conference.

[Yanayev] The Moscow conference opens up broad possibilities for the development of a dialogue with the public based on ideas of the primacy of common human values, the higher significance of human individuality, civil concurrence and reconciliation among nationalities. Parallel public measures on the topic of CSCE human dimension will indeed take place in Moscow. Actually they have already started with the conduct in May of the Sakharov International Congress under the slogan "Peace, Progress, and Human Rights."

It is anticipated that the total number of representatives of various international and national nongovernmental organizations and private individuals could come to 20,000 persons. On the initiative of a number of Soviet organizations an organizational committee and a working secretariat for the preparation and conduct of

parallel measures were created. They include representatives of numerous public and legal defense organizations, parliamentarians as well as outstanding figures in science, culture, and the arts.

The Soviet side will strictly fulfill the corresponding positions of the final document of the Copenhagen meeting concerning openness and admission of nongovernmental organizations to the conference on human dimension of the general European process. Optimal conditions will be created in Moscow for contact between political figures, diplomats, and public representatives.

In conclusion I would like to say that despite the economic and financial difficulties being experienced by our country, the Soviet side is filled with determination to do everything possible in order to ensure that the Moscow conference takes place at a good organizational level, in complete accordance with the high standards adopted by the CSCE process.

Outlook for European Legal Conference

91UF0960A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jun 91 Union edition p 3

[Article by V. Rudnev: "Unified Legal Ideology for All of Europe?"]

[Text] Unified legal ideology for all of Europe? This was discussed at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists which took place on 27 June at the press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The reason for it was the forthcoming "Law and European Cooperation" international conference scheduled for 22-24 October 1991

In opening the press conference one of the initiators of the international meeting of legal experts, Chairman of the Union of Jurists of the USSR Andrey Trebkov, stressed that the basis of the conference agenda involves the comparative analysis of professional legal and general human problems troubling Europe on the threshold of the 21st Century.

The conference on law and cooperation in Europe is the first trans- European meeting of that nature. Its participants are expected to include well-known figures from governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, outstanding representatives from the legal and scientific community as well as legislators.

It is believed that such questions as the protection of investments, intellectual property, labor law, and social security under market conditions, immigration and emigration legislation and market relations will be discussed within the framework of the Moscow international conference.

In responding to a question by the Izvestiya correspondent on the means to be used for converging three European legal systems—Anglo-Saxon, continental, and

socialist systems, members of the preparatory committee of the international conference made it understood that discussions will not be about the selection of some single system for all countries or unification of European law. The international community is faced with another task—elaboration of a unified European legal ideology while preserving national features and traditions.

Central European 'Buffer' to Mass Emigration

91UF0982A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by Lev Ivanov, Paris: "The Third Europe Instead of the 'Iron Curtain': The Erroneous Opinion About how the Adoption of the Law on Immigration and Emigration Will Result in the Emigration of Millions to the West"]

[Text] Any Western European government can subscribe to the words of Danish Minister of Justice Hans Engell who stated that Denmark welcomes tourists from the Soviet Union on its territory but "decisively opposes emigres from the USSR who want to move their permanent place of residence to the Kingdom." Denmark, just like the rest of Europe, understands that it thereby erects new barriers in place of the destroyed "Iron Curtain," stated Engell. However, "we do not have the capability to resolve the Soviet Union's economic and social problems by making our borders wide open to citizens of that country." Those people who hope to obtain even temporary work contracts should also not particularly count on success: Europe has enough of its owned unemployed (2,600,000 in just France alone). Tourists are issued visas for a limited period of time and are not granted the right to work. Travelers who violate this regulation risk being sent back to their homeland and will never again obtain a visa to the country where they have violated the

"The European Conference," "the Common European Home," and the "United States of Europe"-no matter what you call them, for now this is only a topic for dreams and theoretical structures. The countries of the European Community live with the prospect of building a single European market and a European domain without internal borders which must become a reality on January 1, 1993. And new candidates, even such respectable ones as Austria or Sweden, will only be examined later. However, part of the internal borders will already disappear on December 31, 1991. This is the sense of the agreement signed a year ago in the city of Shengen [transliterated] in Luxembourg. Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy who joined them later, decided, beginning next year, to cease border control on the borders between them and to simultaneously increase the protection of external borders. The "Shengen Agreement," which still needs to be ratified by the parliaments of the signatory countries, is viewed as a general rehearsal for the "European Dozen's" border policy. A common visa policy with regard to third countries is one of the primary requirements for participation in the Shengen group. That is precisely why Italy was compelled to introduce a visa regime for the Arab states of North Africa whose residents until recently could freely come to the Apennine Peninsula. Spain and Portugal, who are not part of the Shengen group, soon followed Italy's example. So, the doors of Southern Europe have already been closed to a broad influx of illegal immigrants. At first glance, the map is the reverse in the north: citizens of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, since April of this year, Poland have obtained free, visa-less entry into the majority of the countries of Western Europe. However, here it is worth noting some geopolitical origins.

Ferents Feyto, a wise old Hungarian Social-Democrat who has already lived in Paris for half a century, has not gotten tired of repeating during recent decades that Europe could have avoided many of its misfortunes if the countries that were victors in the First World War had not eliminated the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Located in the center of Europe, a strong Austria-Hungary, that simultaneously served as a barrier and a bridge between East and West, promoted a European balance. Its fragmentation into a number of small states facilitated first Hitler's then Soviet expansion. Feyto's thoughts appeared to be quite entertaining but, while Europe lived according to Yalta's laws and within the framework of the spheres of influence that had been established there, there was no need to think about any sort of Central Europe. Today, we are finished with Yalta and the realities of the treaties in Saint-Germain and Trianon [transliterated], that defined the new borders of Austria and Hungary in 1919-1920 and as a result of which millions of Hungarians became residents of Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, are returning to us.

The "velvet" and the not too "velvet" revolutions of 1989 in the countries of the former socialist camp have resulted, as we all know, in unanticipated results. For now, only Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (if you do not consider the GDR [German Democratic Republic] which has sunk into oblivion) have put an end to communism and are attempting to build a society that corresponds to the Western concepts of democracy and freedom of entrepreneurship. But therefore was it only because Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague could slightly open the door to the West?

Having glanced at the map of Europe, one can certify that these three countries and Austria, taken together strikingly remind us of Austria-Hungary moved slightly to the north, are an enormous buffer between the countries of the European Community (besides Greece) and the European East. Only several dozen kilometers of border between Yugoslavia and Italy remain "undefended" which today the invasion of refugees from Yugoslavia and Albania threaten more than the other countries of Western Europe. I will not dare to assert that the creation of this buffer zone was exclusively the West's primary goal during the establishment of privileged relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary but it is quite obvious that these three countries understand very well that the gates to the West can once again be closed if they permit unimpeded passage through their territory by citizens of neighboring states who are attempting to illegally end up in Western Europe. For now, Soviet borders are quite reliably protected from within and the main tests have fallen to Hungary's lot.

During the first four months of this year, Hungarian border guards have arrested more than 5,000 Romanians, nearly 300 Pakistanis, 280 Turks, and dozens of Lebanese, Filipinos, and Nigerians who have attempted to illegally cross the Romanian-Hungarian border. There are so many people desiring to get to Hungary and from there to the West that this has become an extremely profitable business for international criminal organizations, including those who specialize in smuggling people. Each candidate to cross the border has to pay his guides from \$1,500-2,000. The most varied methods are used to cross the border: from the traditional crawling in the manner of a military reconnaissance patrol to sealed trucks with false German license plates and false travel documents. And despite this, the overwhelming majority of illegals are detained in Hungary which illustrates the effectiveness of the Central European buffer. Naturally, the Hungarians are not happy, all the more so since the Balkan drug smuggling route that is increasingly popular among the drug mafia runs through their country. But nevertheless the twin barrier is adequately reliable because if someone manages to sneak into Hungary unnoticed with the connivance of the Romanians, it is already quite a bit more difficult to cross the Hungarian-Austrian border: both countries cooperate in the matter of its protection. For now, Poland and Czechoslovakia do not have these problems but they are prepared for a possible influx of illegal refugees at that same time that the Shengen group states are building a single European domain into which citizens of any country of the world can freely move if they have entered Western Europe legally. The right to free emigration from one's country still does not provide the right for free entry into any other country.

My prediction: lines at the European consulates in the Union will become even longer.

CEMA Secretary Views Organization's Demise

91UF0933A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jun 91 p 3

[Interview with Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Sychev, CEMA secretary, by A. Kaverznev: "CEMA: Our Meeting Was Unusual, and Our Separation Will Be Unusual"]

[Text] The farewell session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is to be held today in Budapest. CEMA Secretary V.V. Sychev answered the questions of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

CEMA's death throes have been prolonged. After all, it was supposed to have been dissolved last winter. I remember that a couple of days after the Warsaw Pact military structure had been dissolved in February, the prime ministers of nine countries were supposed to gather in Budapest to come to an agreement on CEMA's future. Everything seemed to be ready, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry had announced the accreditation of journalists, but the meeting was postponed unexpectedly—at the last minute and without any official explanation.

What happened?

I began my conversation with V.V. Sychev on the 18th floor of the almost empty building on Novyy Arbat with this question. Vyacheslav Vladimirovich reminded me that he, as the employee of an international organization, could not comment on the actions of member countries. Well, if that was the proper procedure....

[Kaverznev] Why was the Budapest meeting postponed?

[Sychev] I will remind you of the events that led up to it. Last January the prime ministers of the CEMA countries agreed on two points at the 45th CEMA session in Sofia. First, that all of the countries were still interested in developing multilateral economic cooperation. Second, that they also believed that CEMA needed radical renovation. A special commission was formed to prepare proposals on the reform of CEMA. It performed this job conscientiously, not because it had to, but because it wanted to. As a result, by 6 February of this year a set of documents had been prepared for the establishment of the so-called OMEC—the Organization for International Economic Cooperation, which was supposed to replace CEMA as its successor. I want to emphasize the fact that total agreement had been reached on every statement in these documents, on every single punctuation mark. It was rare for documents to be submitted to a session without any differences of opinion whatsoever. The entire set of documents was approved for submission to the session by the special commission on behalf of the member governments.

Here is what happened after that. The next CEMA session was supposed to be held in Budapest at the end of February. On 15 February the prime minister of Hungary sent official invitations, in accordance with the

conventional procedure, to all of his colleagues—the prime ministers of the other CEMA countries. Then, in line with the same procedure, a collective news release was printed in the press of the CEMA countries on 16-17 February, reporting that on 27 February in Budapest there would be a meeting of the CEMA session and a summit conference, where the documents establishing the new organization for international economic cooperation would be signed. We had already packed our bags and were getting ready to fly to Budapest when we suddenly received a letter from the Hungarian representation to CEMA on 22 February, saying that in the new situation that had taken shape in recent weeks, there were doubts about the membership of the new organization and its objectives.

This came as a big surprise to me and my colleagues. We immediately convened a meeting of representatives of the countries in this very room. Not one had the slightest idea what the "new situation that has taken shape in recent weeks" was, or who had doubts about the group of members or exactly what kind of doubts these were....

Two or three hours later we received another letter from our Hungarian colleagues: They saw no guarantees that the documents establishing the new organization would be signed without any amendments.

There were no guarantees to be seen. The representatives of most countries said they had to report this to their governments. After a series of contacts on Saturday and Sunday, they gathered for another meeting on Monday and arrived at a conclusion: Without any guarantees that the set of documents would be signed, they had no other choice but to postpone the session.

[Kaverznev] And without a word of explanation. Among the journalists in Budapest, however, the rumor quickly spread that Hungary would be pleased to officiate at CEMA's funeral but did not want to be involved in establishing a new organization that would inherit the features of its predecessor, and that the Hungarian leadership had probably enlisted the support of some other East European countries.

[Sychev] So, I repeat, we were facing an unprecedented situation: The documents on which we had worked for a year under the conditions of absolutely equal partnership, and on which we had reached complete agreement, were suddenly disavowed. What should we do?

The permanent representatives of countries to CEMA and experts met for several conferences and consultations, and the situation today is the following. The East European countries do not want the dissolution of CEMA to be linked with the simultaneous creation of a new organization for multilateral cooperation. If this kind of organization is established, under no conditions should it be regarded as a successor to CEMA. In general, the new organization is a separate matter requiring further discussion: on the method of its establishment, on whether it should be established at all.... No one

actually said it was unnecessary, but I think the discussion of these matters so far has been quite listless.

Some East European countries have suggested that the new organization should be a European regional group—i.e., that Vietnam, Cuba, and Mongolia should not be members. They have suggested that it should be nothing more than a consultative body, and so forth.

[Kaverznev] How will CEMA be dissolved?

[Sychev] The final, 46th CEMA session will take place in Budapest on 28 June. It will not be the usual meeting of prime ministers, but a gathering of the permanent representatives of the countries to CEMA, who will sign a protocol dissolving the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The protocol specifically says that CEMA will cease to exist 90 days after the signing date. A liquidation commission will be formed to dispose of the organization's property during this period.

[Kaverznev] What does the term "CEMA property" include?

[Sychev] The CEMA building and a few other facilities.

[Kaverznev] Has a consensus been reached on the disposition of this property? According to the Hungarian permanent representative, Minister of International Economic Relations Bela Kadar, the Soviet Union wants to buy out the property, but the East European countries want to find a way of using it jointly.

[Sychev] I would say that the matter has not even been discussed seriously yet, although the parties have certainly made some preliminary comments.

[Kaverznev] Your building looks almost deserted. How many people are left on the Secretariat staff?

[Sychev] The CEMA Secretariat has been undergoing constant reduction for the last year. Although it never acquired the astronomical dimensions of, for example, the staff of the European Economic Community, where tens of thousands of people are employed, we had 532 specialists and several hundred administrative and technical personnel. Gradually, however, as the CEMA standing commissions and committees finished up their work, we reduced their staffs. On 1 July there will be around 40 specialists left—only the members of the liquidation commission. Of course, there will also be a small technical staff to keep the building from deteriorating. The current joke in CEMA is that all of our personnel can be divided into two groups: liquidators and waiters. The liquidators are the ones who will serve on the liquidation commission, and the waiters are the ones who are waiting to be recalled by their own governments.

[Kaverznev] Vyacheslav Vladimirovich, CEMA will soon cease to exist. It is time to sum up the results.

[Sychev] I came to CEMA at the end of 1983 from the academic community and I plan to go back to it. I am not

a CEMA "native" and I think that is why my opinions are free of subjectivism and feelings of obligation to defend "the honor of the regiment."

CEMA was alive for 42 years. It was established in January 1949. I am not just defending my own corporation when I state my deep conviction that CEMA did its job well. All of us are probably inclined to go from one extreme to the other in our judgments. First we paint everything only in rosy hues and then we cover all of this with black paint. I am certain that no one color can be used in portraying CEMA activities. We have to consider the international political environment in which CEMA came into being. It was established as an instrument to adapt the economies of countries to the realities of life in these countries.

I am certainly not saying that everything was done well in CEMA, but I would like to remind you of one fact: Back in the middle of the 1970s it was not our personnel, but independent economists from the United Nations who called the CEMA region the most dynamically developing part of the world in the economic sense. Later, as we all know, negative features began accumulating in the economies of virtually all of the CEMA countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and it is impossible for cooperation between countries to go well when their economic development is going badly.

[Kaverznev] CEMA was also called an instrument the USSR used against the fraternal countries in its own economic expansion.

[Sychev] Some people said that Moscow used CEMA to force partners to do economically inconvenient things. I must say that in the 7 years I worked here, I never saw a single case of this, and in the documents covering the period before I came to CEMA, I have never found a single case in which someone was forced to participate in a project. Interest was always the guiding principle in CEMA. When a joint project was being planned or an agreement on cooperation in some field was being drawn up, no one ever forced anyone else to participate, for the simple reason that this kind of coercion was impossible.

[Kaverznev] But pressure could have been exerted on another, higher level.

[Sychev] I do not know of a single case of this kind of pressure in the years I worked here. After all, this would be absolutely senseless, because forcing a partner to cooperate when he does not want to work with you, and then expecting him to make the deliveries, would be simply ridiculous.

Furthermore, people with no direct relationship to CEMA think it was mainly engaged in regulating trade between countries. They are mistaken. CEMA was never allowed to make decisions on trade issues!

[Kaverznev] What about the coordination of five-year plans, which we so proudly described as a new type of international economic integration? [Sychev] It is true that the schedule for the coordination of five-year plans was announced in CEMA—the calendar dates of the commencement and completion of this work. What actually happened was this: Representatives of the state planning committees of two countries would sit down at the table, and the coordination would consist largely of agreements on tentative lists of reciprocal shipments in the next 5 years. My friends sometimes asked me why I was not doing my job properly. Bulgarian tomatoes had been in the stores for decades. Where had they gone? They refused to believe that CEMA had nothing to do with this.

[Kaverznev] Then what did CEMA do?

[Sychev] I will not change my opinion. I am prepared to defend my point of view and I will tell anyone that CEMA was quite effective in making the arrangements for sectorial cooperation between countries—in power engineering, metallurgy, the chemical industry, communications, transportation, and other branches. I am not speaking of the time when I worked in CEMA. Specialization and cooperation in the production of many types of goods were established earlier. Now this sectorial multilateral cooperation has been disrupted. I am deeply convinced that this is a mistake.

There are many obvious reasons why multilateral cooperation benefits all parties. I will name just one: the

technical level of the products of machine building and other branches. Let us be frank: It is so low that the products cannot be sold in the world market. Therefore, as long as we are producing these items, the only solution is to sell them to each other.

[Kaverznev] But this would perpetuate the low technical level.

[Sychev] The modernization of industry and the transition to the market will take a certain number of years, but we still have to make a living today.

[Kaverznev] You are saying that the multilateral cooperation between our countries should be maintained. Is this realistic today, now that some governments are "returning to Europe" and are ostentatiously turning their backs on the USSR?

[Sychev] Here is what is happening today. Many interested enterprises in our countries are trying to preserve multilateral cooperation in different spheres. This would not be cooperation between states or between governments, but between interested enterprises, organizations, combines, institutes, and laboratories. It turns out that there are many of them, and they cannot do this without the established network of cooperative ties.

[Kaverznev] Thank you for the interview.

Kyrgyz Prime Minister on Foreign Interest in Republic

91US0609A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 29 Jun 91 p 5

[Interview with the Kyrgyz Prime Minister Nasirdin Isanovich Isanov, by L. Kalashnikov: "All Flags of the World to Kyrgyzstan"]

[Text] Recently, particularly after the adoption of the republic's Sovereignty Declaration, Kyrgyzstan more and more frequently has begun to be visited by representatives of foreign business and political circles.

[Kalashnikov] How can one explain such lively interest among the professional circles of many countries in Southeast Asia, Europe and America in Krygyzstan? was the question our correspondent started the discussion with the republic Prime Minister, Nasirdin Isanovich Isanov

[Isanov] In actuality, with the adoption of the sovereignty declaration by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the process of developing ties with foreign countries has become noticeably more active. And what is remarkable is that this has a two-sided and interested nature.

How can we explain all of this? On the one hand, having gained a real opportunity for independently determining the policy of developing cooperation with foreign countries, the republic government and its business circles have made a significant effort to establish close contacts with foreign partners. In this process, a major role has been played by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev and his personal contacts. On the other hand, the annually increasing interest of the business circles in foreign countries brought about by their knowledge of the potential of the republic in the areas of the economy, science, the presence of natural wealth, and the development and complete exploitation of which with the aid of the wealthy foreign firms will make it possible for Kyrgyzstan in the immediate future to become a mutually advantageous partner.

[Kalashnikov] How broad are the business ties of the republic with the foreign firms and to what degree do they already influence or make it possible to influence the further development of economic life, the formation of a market and its saturation with goods and ultimately contribute to the emergence of the Kyrgyzstan economy from the crisis?

[Isanov] As of now, the business ties of the republic with the foreign firms have become rather active. But for now they still have not provided a fundamental impetus in developing the economy of Kyrgyzstan. As a rule, collaboration with foreign partners has a buy-and-sell [trading] nature. The share of operating joint enterprises in the republic economy is extremely insignificant. We are giving priority to the development of mutually advantageous relations with the nations of Southeast Asia and Europe. We have already registered the joint

Kyrgyz-Lichtenstein enterprise Alay-Ital. This is being established in the south of the republic on the basis of the Osh Industrial-Trade Silk Association. The initial phase involves the reconstruction of the existing shops at this enterprise, and equipping them with highly productive Italian equipment. Alay-Ital will operate on local raw materials and annually produce almost a million meters of natural silk and 2 ½ million meters of magnificent velvet.

Good business contacts have been established by Kyrgyzstan with one of the major South Korean firms Gold Star. Together with it on the basis of the Tokmak Radio Plant a joint enterprise has been established for producing color television sets.

For a long time now, we have been collaborating with the Chinese People's Republic. Particularly in establishing joint enterprises involving the processing of food products. Of course, we purchase by barter the equipment and production facilities, the lines for manufacturing canned fruits and vegetables, for producing beer and nonalcoholic beverages, knitwear and other consumer goods.

Contracts have also been concluded with Italian and Turkish firms to process sheepskins. Soon our joint enterprises will be turning out the first products, the world famous Turkish sheepskin coats made from Kyrgyz material.

This year export deliveries to the Kyrgyzstan Republic should reach 16 million foreign exchange rubles and this is a significant growth. However, it is also extremely insufficient. Certainly, our demand for imported equipment is the greatest. For this reason, we are intensifying work to seek out new sources of delivery.

All the same, we cannot help but point out that many visits by the foreign guests for now have merely the nature of a first acquaintance. But contacts with business circles are limited to the signing of statements of intention and agreements on collaboration. But in such visitors we would like to see our business partners of tomorrow.

[Kalashnikov] Nasirdin Isanovich, in May of this year there was your first official visit at the head of a governmental delegation to Turkey. Could you tell us about the business and political relations between Kyrgyzstan and Turkey?

[Isanov] We are satisfied with the results of the official visit to Turkey. The first testing of the forces and abilities of the young Kyrgyz diplomacy overseas—and this is precisely how we must view the trip by the government delegation of Kyrgyzstan to Turkey—met our expectations.

Why was this country chosen for the visit and not some other foreign state? Here there are several factors. Our sovereign republics and the Turkish and Kirghiz peoples have much in common. There is the similarity of historical roots, the closeness of language, cultures, way of life, spiritual heritage and traditions. There is the relative geographic proximity and the identical natural and climatic conditions. And hence the largely similar structure of agricultural production, including wool, cotton, tobacco and vegetables. But the main factor is the experience gained by Turkey in the area of a rapid transition to a market economy.

Agreements have been reached with a number of Turkish firms on broadening bilateral ties. We have set 17 promising areas of collaboration. Primarily in the area of processing agricultural products, fur raw materials and the output of goods, in developing telecommunications and so forth. Questions have been coordinated on broadening cultural contacts as well as the training and exchange of specialists.

[Kalashnikov] What is your view on the prospects of business and political relations between the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the foreign countries?

[Isanov] Certainly these are the most optimistic. With the adoption by the Supreme Soviet of the Law on the General Principles for Foreign Economic Activities of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the republic has assumed the status of a principal in foreign economic ties. As of today, agreements on collaboration have been concluded with North Korea and Turkey. Preparations are underway for a visit of a Kyrgyzstan governmental delegation to Pakistan. At present, a definite orientation has already been established for collaboration with the new industrial countries of Asia. Contacts are continuing to develop with the foreign CEMA countries which are the basic consumers of products from our industry.

Soviet-German Program To Build Five Reservist Training Centers

91UM0767A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major I. Ivanyuk: "USSR—FRG: Training Centers for Reservists"]

[Text] Somehow, we do not contemplate the fact that soldiers and officers, who are returning home from the Western Group of Forces and transferring to reserves, will encounter a new and unaccustomed social environment. They cannot help but worry, though, about their prospects for settling into civilian life and, above all, about the threat of unemployment, which is being mentioned increasingly often lately. The redeployment of Soviet military units from Germany will have a direct effect on the labor market in our country: By the experts preliminary estimates, about half a million people will need jobs.

There is hope that they will be helped by the agreement recently signed by the USSR Ministry of Labor and Society Issues and the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agreement outlines a joint Soviet-German program of professional training for military people transferred to the reserves, and adult members of their families; among other things, it envisions the creation of a number of specialized training centers on the USSR territory.

"We have already decided on the location for the five base centers," says M. Zakharchuk, deputy chief of the USSR State Committee for Labor Main Administration on Employment. "Two of them will be oriented towards agriculture—in Ramenskoye in Moscow Oblast and in Alma-Ata; three others will specialize in construction—respectively, in Leningrad, Minsk, and Kiev. Where the other five centers will be located and what their professional orientation will be is to be decided by sovereign republics on the basis of their estimates of their own needs."

It is envisioned that these will be multiprofile learning institutions on the basis of existing professional-technical schools. The length of education will be six months. During that time, former members of the military will be able not only to master the skills that are in short supply, but also to acquire the necessary commercial skills so that those who want to could open their own business. Because of the fact that the education level in these new schools will be noticeably higher than in professional-technical schools, it is planned to give them a special status.

The FRG Government allocated 200 million Deutsche marks for the implementation of this program. This money will be used to equip the centers with the equipment, training devices, educational aids, and programs. If necessary, additional training of our instructors will be conducted.

As of now, 58 German companies, schools, and enterprises have expressed the desire to participate in the implementation of the program. A specially created commission analyzes and selects their proposals on a preliminary basis. The final results will be determined by competition, the first round of which will take place in the near future.

In the Soviet Union, sponsoring enterprises have also become involved; they will help to restructure the existing educational base, to adapt the proposed educational programs to local conditions, and provide material support. Most importantly, the enterprise must guarantee a job for each graduate for a period of at least five years. In Kiev, for instance, the sponsors list includes the industrial and scientific-industrial associations Techinform, Mir, and Helios, and the Kievotdelstroy trust.

It is impossible to list all the professions for which training will be performed. Let us mention just a few: auto service mechanic; computer equipment adjuster; electric and gas welder—with the right to receive an international certificate. Many skills are related to construction business, environmental protection, and computer technology.

The education will be conducted by a "modular" method: Three months for a general course, and another three months for specialization. There will be an opportunity to master several related professions. In other words, everything will be done to prepare a person for independent work—as a farmer, in the service sector, or in small business.

A large-scale survey conducted in the Western Group of Forces showed that 76 percent of the respondents would like to master working professions on such terms or to upgrade their skills in this way. They believe—probably, with a good reason—that this will help them to overcome the "market" barrier.

TASS"]

Yeltsin May Visit NATO HQ This Fall 91P50255A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jul 91 p 1

[Item under the rubric "In a Short Line: ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA—RIA—URALINFORM—

[Text] It is possible that Russian President Boris Yeltsin will visit Brussels in the autumn of this year at the invitation of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.

'Persecution' of Ex-Police Agents Decried

91UF0967A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent Ye. Chernykh, Prague: "Sacrifice. Part 2: Dissidents Were Previously Persecuted in Eastern Europe. Now—Former Intelligence Service Agents Are Being Persecuted."]

[Text] Nearly 30 ChSFR [Czech and Slovak Federative Republic] Federal Assembly deputies appealed to the European Human Rights Commission, expressing their concern about compliance with these very rights—no, not in Albania, Iraq, or in remote Cuba, but... in their native Czechoslovakia. In the country where precisely rights protectors and acknowledged democrats, who for long years fought against totalitarianism, have come to power. In the letter, the parliamentarians warned about the threat for the Czechoslovakian democracy of the phenomenon known by the designation "lustratus."

This Latin term means purification by means of sacrifice. At one time, religious rights were performed to drive out disease or an impure force. Right now, the Middle Ages expression is once again in great demand. But the atheistic era has made an adjustment. The purification from former community state security agents is occurring. But then again, to some people in Eastern Europe this organization appears to be that same devil.

Czechoslovakia has gone farther than anyone else in the lustratus of social life. A special parliamentary commission is conducting it. Indeed, they created the commission for an entirely different purpose: to ascertain all of the circumstances of the events of November 17, 1989. Student demands and Anti-Communist M. Doleysh's scandalous article have prompted this. The article and the BBC documentary television film "Checkmate" on the hand of the KGB asserted that the CIA and KGB, Mossad, and the Masons were behind the "tender revolution." Last autumn, the commission efficiently heard communist and opposition leaders, including President V. Havel. It seemed that just a little bit more and the country would learn the entire truth about those days.

But soon the 17 November Commission shifted to lustratus of the Federal Assembly itself. As a result of a long and painstaking loyalty check, a dozen "impure" deputies, who were somehow or other connected with state security, were discovered among the 300 deputies.

A direct television broadcast was conducted during the public declassification of the agents. All of Czechoslovakia observed the dramatic events in the parliament. It was then that lustratus provided the first entrails. In general they had previously suggested to the "impure" that they could leave quietly, in the English manner, in order for the matter not to lead to nationwide publicity. They refused. And, raising it to a parliamentary Calvary, they defended themselves, they reminded the others

about human rights, the presumption of innocence, and other legal standards. They categorically rejected their ties with the secret service. They also shared their colleague's opinion. Prominent Politician R. Saher frankly stated that by this step parliament was approaching not democracy but political processes.

The disclosure received worldwide publicity. American Senator P. Simon sent a letter to V. Havel: "I have admired the high moral principles which you have demonstrated in Czechoslovakia and in the world. But unfortunately recent events are beginning to harm Czechoslovakia's good name in my country."

At the end of May, the "impure" (with the exception of two) plus 18 of their reliable deputy colleagues sent a petition to Strasbourg. They stressed that the loyalty checks were being conducted without legal basis and contradict Czechoslovakia's existing legal standards and the ChSFR's international legal obligations. The deputies expressed the fear that the discriminatory process that has begun will be deepened and will cause the destabilization of society.

Actually, the commission, not satisfied with a loyalty check of the Federal Assembly and the ChSFR government, proposed to lustratus a number of other institutions, especially the mass media. And generally to publish lists of all clandestine state security agents: rezidents, agents, and owners of secret apartments. They assert that there were 140,000 of them. Nearly one for every 100 citizens in Czechoslovakia.

Let us recall that a year ago the President's Press Secretary M. Zhantovskiy had already expressed himself on that theme at the Prague meeting of Eastern and Western journalists.

"We decided," he said, "that if anyone publishes the lists that they will go to jail. Some of our informers were not only guilty but also simultaneously victims. Many of them have families and children.

In Czechoslovakia, the understanding is growing that lustratus amateur activities may be carried too far. The question has turned out to not be so simple: He collaborated or he did not collaborate. For example, the commission "exposed" 14 men in the federal government (it is true that their names are being held in secrecy.)

"It is impossible to consider everyone on the state security lists to be an informer," said Premier M. Calfa in this regard.

One "exposed" vice minister headed a scientifictechnical delegation to Vienna at the beginning of the 1970's. The state security organs asked him how many people were going, why, and whom they would meet. They questioned him once again upon his return. Who is he—an intelligence agent? Or an example of another "impure" person. He built Czechoslovakian AES's [nuclear power plants]. All of the cooperation with state security consisted of economic counterintelligence questioning him: are foreigners not interested in the nuclear power plant and do foreign diplomats not appear there?

"It was a question of protecting the facility and not about betraying people," stressed the prime minister.

President V. Havel also came out against publication of the lists of all personnel workers and state security secret agents.

A special commission was also created in the former GDR [German Democratic Republic]. J. Gauk heads it. A loyalty check is being conducted of the land parliament deputies. Some of them have already surrendered their seats. Demands to conduct lustratus of members of the Romanian parliament for their ties to the sadly infamous Securitate are being heard in Bucharest. The Hungarian government proposed a draft law of a "large purge."

In Bulgaria, the Great National Assembly commission has prepared a secret report on the deputies who cooperated with the political police. But parliament's leadership had still not managed to discuss it before the names of 32 "agents" appeared in the press. In the opinion of the country's President Zh. Zhelev, it would be better to solve the problem of secret service agent lists based on the example of Greece or Spain, that is, to simply burn them.

Poland has a special approach to this delicate problem. In the middle of May while speaking at a Sejm session, Minister of Internal Affairs H. Majewski stated that the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is not promulgating the names of former security service and civilian militia agents. These documents have extremely important significance for insuring the state's defense capability and security. There are a total of nearly 3,000,000 names on the MVD's lists from 1944 to 1989. And neither the ministry nor the special commission has the capability to perform loyalty checks on them all.

But the primary argument of the opponents of publication is something else. Publicity would disrupt the political balance that has been achieved in the country. It could also become a dangerous precedent for the future since all of the intelligence services in the world take advantage of the help of citizens who are not cadre workers. The main principle of cooperation—is the guarantee of not divulging contacts. Violation of this principle would inflict irreparable damage on the effectiveness of intelligence, counterintelligence, and police operations. Where are the guarantees that a new draft law on loyalty checks will not appear with the next change of power?

Meanwhile in May, while discussing where or not to publish the lists of all former state security agents, ChSFR deputies adopted a law on the New Federal Security Service which will create its own network of agents. As if in response, MLADA FRONTA DNES recently carried a fresh anecdote. "A patient is being taken to an insane asylum. He suggested that parliament legalize the instantaneous publication of the name of each person who becomes a Federal Security Service agent in order to anticipate future loyalty checks."

Politicians and deputies in Eastern Europe are arguing about lustratus. And what about in ordinary life? According to the latest public opinion poll, the population of that same Czechoslovakia does not at all not consider this problem to be one of the most important.

The "big leap" from socialism to capitalism has not occurred in the countries of the former Eastern bloc. The restructuring of the economic mechanism to the market tune is proceeding with more difficulty than had been assumed. And therefore, obviously, other politicians are demanding the conduct of a "great purge." Someone has to be sacrificed. I recall that the primary meaning of the word "lustratus" is purifying by means of sacrifice.

Soviets Residing in Czechoslovakia Voice Concerns

91UN1776A Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by N. Shevtsov: "Where Is Your Home. . . . About 10,000 Soviet Citizens Permanently Residing in the USSR Proved to Be in a Difficult Position"]

[Text] Today one can encounter them in every European country. In official documents they appear as Soviet citizens permanently residing abroad. In life they are called in short Soviet citizens. About 10,000 of them live in Czechoslovakia, more than a thousand have Prague registration. They settled in this country in various years, but everyone has a Soviet passport, everyone kept the citizenship of our country. And nevertheless, even having a "red leather passport case", they, being abroad, never felt themselves to be full-fledged citizens of the USSR, not having the possibility of enjoying the rights of the Soviet Constitution. For a long time they treated them in our country as a self-supporting person, adding them to the emigrants.

The majority of our compatriots now living in Czechoslovakia proved to be in this country for the most ordinary reasons. Having been married, they moved to live in the country of their spouse, receiving a residence permit.

Precisely this is what happened with Igor Zolotarev. Being a student of the Mechanical-Mathematical Department of Moscow State University, he became acquainted with a girl from Czechoslovakia studying in the USSR. Her name was Blank. The young people fell in love and decided to get married. Having finished university, Igor moved to Czechoslovakia. He has been living in this country for almost 15 years, working as a scientific associate in the Institute of Thermomechanics of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. There are two children in his family.

And nevertheless it can be said that Igor was lucky, he was able to find work in his specialty and is counted among the best specialists of the institute. In the beginning, his lack of knowledge of the language was a small hindrance in his work as a physicist.

Unfortunately, things did not turn out that way for all of our compatriots. For many of them, the language barrier became an insurmountable obstacle, which did not allow them to find interesting work, especially those who had a humanistic education. Moreover, the weak vocational training received in a number of our, above all provincial, VUZ's did not correspond to the requirements demanded for acceptance for work in Czechoslovak institutions and enterprises. As a result, they were forced to change profession, others completely ceased to work. Women for their entire life became homemakers.

Probably some of them were attracted by life abroad. But it did not turn out to be such a "sweet" life as they had originally imagined. The former authorities treated the Soviet people who arrived with distrust. And it was no coincidence that in 1957 the Club of Soviet Citizens, which was created right after the end of the war, ceased to exist. Our compatriots were pushed aside from participating in political life and did not enjoy the right to vote.

Relations with the Homeland also did not turn out to be simple. Visitation of relatives who remained in the Soviet Union was made extremely difficult. Even having a Soviet passport, it was possible to go to the USSR only with a visa, which was obtained in the consulate department of the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia. To return home for good practically did not seem possible because of the lost registration.

The stormy political processes that seized both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia inspired in our compatriots both new hopes and new anxieties. With gladness they took note of how, with the changes in Soviet society that had begun, people's attitudes to them change. Suspicion and distrust gave way to consciousness of the fact that they are the kind of Soviet people who passionately experience what is happening in our country and are alarmed about its future. On the day of the referendum of March 17, when the future of the USSR was decided, many of them proved to be among the first who came to the club of the Soviet embassy to cast their vote. People came from various cities of Czechoslovakia. Among them were also citizens of extremely advanced age.

In September of 1990, Soviet citizens learned with gladness that now they can travel to the USSR without any visa. With emotion they took part in the elections to USSR people's deputy. There also were those among them who had voted the last time 30 years ago. But, unfortunately, having cast their votes for the candidates to people's deputy, they never saw them again. They did not find time to come to Czechoslovakia to give an account of their work to the voters, to tell them how they

defend their interests. And you see how necessary it is for these interests to be defended by someone. For up to now the doors of all institutes in our country were closed to a person with a Soviet passport who was born in Czechoslovakia. He is allowed to enter a housing cooperative only on the condition that accounts will be settled in freely convertible currency, which the majority of our citizens living in Eastern Europe do not have at their disposal.

In the meantime no one can defend their interests in the USSR, for they do not have a single representative of their own in any legislative organ of the country.

With alarm our compatriots found out that now, having made their way to the Soviet Union, they can obtain air tickets only for foreign currency. In Czechoslovakia an air ticket for the itinerary Prague-Moscow costs 7,000 kroners (approximately R750). For that kind of money not everyone will allow himself to be in the Homeland unnecessarily. Our compatriots were far from enthusiastic in accepting the decision of "Mezhkniga [Mezhdunarodnaya knigal to sell periodical publications only for foreigncurrency. Recalculated in kroners, the subscription prices increased tenfold. People are forced to give up their subscriptions, thereby being deprived of important sources of information about our country. Already in May of this year, Czechoslovakia stopped the broadcast of the first program of Soviet television. During some periods of the workday it is possible to watch the program "Vremya." But this year, after going over to summer time, the leadership of Czechoslovak television, supposedly because of the fact that this did not happen in our country and thereby difficulties arose with the broadcast time, gave it up completely.

"After the November revolution," pensioner Yelena Nikolayevna Vatutina, who has been living in Czechoslovakia for almost 35 years, recounts, "our situation deteriorated sharply. Having seized certain strata of the population, anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments manifested themselves also in the attitude to us. This we feel in terms of the conduct of our next-door neighbors and colleagues at work. For them, Soviet citizens are, above all, communists, with whom it is necessary, they say, to fight. We become undesirable persons. It is especially painful to find out that our children and grandchildren are reproached in school for their Soviet citizenship. Moreover, not only children but also teachers are involved in this."

A few words about Yelena Nikolayevna herself. She is the daughter of the hero of the past war, the legendary general N. V. Vatutin. In 1956 she moved to Czechoslovakia, having been married to a citizen of this country. Now she has two grown sons. The older one returned with his family to the Soviet Union. The younger one lives in Prague. Yelena Nikolayevna herself until recently worked in the secretariat of the chief Soviet consultant in the construction of the subway in Prague. In 1989 the Czechoslovak side repudiated the services of

our metro-construction specialists. After their departure, work for Yelena Nikolayevna was not found. She is living on a pension.

During the past year, hundreds of Soviet citizens have lost their work in Czechoslovakia. In connection with the reorganization of production that has begun and the reduction of staffs called forth by the transition to a market economy, they, as foreigners, are dismissed first of all. To find new work is practically impossible. After the "velvet revolution," because people were afraid that they would lose their jobs, there was a noticeable increase in the number of applications to the consular department of the USSR embassy in Prague for renunciation of Soviet citizenship. If there were 35 in 1985 and in 1989—62, in 1990 the number of such applications reached 361, and during the first 4 months of this year—more than 100.

The revival of the Club of Soviet Citizens could improve the situation. Its registration and the granting of legal status to it would make it possible for the members of club to engage in entrepreneurial and commercial activity, whose significance in the conditions of the privatization that is taking place in the country is growing more and more. The creation of the club would prevent the growth of unemployment among Soviet citizens in Czechoslovakia. Finally, it could become the mediator in the establishment of business contacts between Czechoslovak entrepreneurs and Soviet cooperators and organizations interested in the creation of joint enterprises. To a certain extent, the club would take upon itself the protection of the interests of Soviet citizens.

However, up to now it has not been created. Already before November of last year, I. Zolotarev relates, we turned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia with the request to have the club registered. But at that time we were refused. After the "velvet revolution" we sent a new request. But the new leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is dragging out the periods of review of the petition established by itself. Recently, in response to a recurrent inquiry, they told us that a decision has not yet been made. Meanwhile it is well known that in the Soviet Union the officially sanctioned society of Ya. Komekskiy is operating, which unites the Czechs and Slovaks living in the USSR. (To this I would like to add that even the letter of the Soviet ambassador B. D. Pankin did not help, which was addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ya. Langosh, and which talks about the importance of the creation of such a club.

The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and the Rodina Society could take upon themselves the protection of the interests of our compatriots. However, the contacts with these organizations leave a great deal to be desired, since their representatives only rarely visit Czechoslovakia, preferring business trips to Western countries.

In the meantime, Soviet citizens can count only on the assistance of the consular department of the USSR embassy in Czechoslovakia. Not long ago, with its active participation, our compatriots were granted premises in the House of Soviet Science and Culture, in which they can now assemble and discuss plans of joint undertakings, for example, the organization of subbotniks for cleaning the territory of the Olshanskiy Cemetery, where Soviet soldiers who liberated Czechoslovakia are buried, as well as compatriots belonging to several generations of the Russian emigration.

Lately, Ye. N. Vatutina says, it has become fashionable in the Soviet press to criticize consular officials. On the contrary, I would like to say good words about them. They do not break off relations with us, are constantly interested in our concerns and problems, and try to be helpful in their solution. I, for example, am extremely grateful to the staff members of the consular department for helping me to quickly arrange a trip to Kiev, where my father was buried, they reserved a hotel for me and informed the comrades-in-arms of my father about my arrival. There the 45th anniversary of his death was observed. I was very warmly received in Kiev. Honestly speaking, Yelena Nikolayevna continues, we feel a little bit ashamed that in the Soviet Union they are now interested in the descendants of outstanding grandees, not taking note of the lives of many thousands of simple Soviet citizens who left the Soviet Union in the 1950's to 1980's. And, you see, many of them never severed their ties with the Homeland and unselfishly propagated Russian culture and national traditions.

Representatives of the Soviet citizens living permanently in Czechoslovakia shared their concerns at a meeting with the USSR ambassador in Czechoslovakia, B. D. Pankin. They expressed the general desire of our compatriots to have dual citizenship, which would give them the possibility of fully enjoying the political rights in both countries. However, the decision of this question is connected with the attainment of the corresponding bilateral agreements on an international level.

But on the other hand, it is up to our side to grant those who live permanently in Czechoslovakia the right to work in numerous Soviet institutions. Many of them have a higher education and, in contrast to some of the specialists sent from the USSR, have a fine command of the Czech and Slovak languages. They could work in the House of Soviet Science and Culture, in technical centers created under different foreign trade associations, and in the Soviet school. Their use would make it possible to save significant funds that are spent for sending our specialists from the Soviet Union.

...I hear all the same something scornful in the word "Soviet citizens". And how much would I like for it to disappear from the diplomatic and everyday vocabulary, for there not to be a division into those who live in the Soviet Union and who live abroad, for all people with Soviet passports to enjoy identical rights, regardless of where their house is located.

Polish TU Leader Miodowicz Interviewed

91UF0968A Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview with All Poland Trade Union Alliance Leader A. Miodowicz by TRUD Correspondent R. Urmantsev, Warsaw, no date given: "A. Miodowicz: We Oppose the 'Shock Treatment"]

[Text] The All Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ) is the Republic of Poland's largest workers' organization. A. Miodowicz has been heading it for many years. Prior to that, he initially worked as a builder and then for more than 30 years as a metallurgist.

"The most horrible thing for a union worker," says A. Miodowicz, " is to lose the peoples' trust. He always needs to move just a little bit ahead of events and always have reference points in front of him. To see the light at the end of the tunnel." Miodowicz thinks that his frequent contact with the collective helps him to see this light at the end of the tunnel. He must visit the blast furnace in Poznan that he once built with his own hands no less than twice a month.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the first question was devoted to the problems of metallurgists.

[Urmantsev] Your impression from your last trip to Poznan?

[Miodowicz] It was not encouraging. We once prided ourselves on the fact that we were the most privileged people in our province. Hardly anyone else had such high wages. Good pensions. The best rest home in the province. And all this was explicable: the work of metallurgists is the most difficult and it is shift work. Well what about right now? A cooperator receives several times as much. The fear that they will not be able to provide for their old age has appeared among my former work comrades, the majority of whom have already retired.

[Urmantsev] Right now the newspapers are full of reports and commentaries exactly about that—about Sejm consideration of a draft law on pensions and the repeal of existing privileges associated with their payment

[Miodowicz] First of all about the so-called privileges. We have absolutely diametrically opposite opinions with the government on that score. Can you really call compensation for difficult working conditions or for a disability privileges? They are precisely trying either to freeze or eliminate them. And compensation affects an enormous army of workers—those same metallurgists, miners, railroad workers, teachers, and journalists.... If everything was so simple, the draft law could be called a misunderstanding. However, it deprives people of a feeling of social confidence and drastically reduces pension amounts. Therefore, we decisively oppose its adoption in the form in which it has been submitted to the

Sejm and we will insist that the alternative draft developed by the All Poland Trade Union Alliance be considered, first of all in commissions and later in Sejm sessions. It stipulates first of all an urgent review of pension amounts as a result of the cost of living increase and also the adoption of decisions associated with the social insurance institution that exists in Poland today.

I want to stress: the government is practically not considering social problems in its transition program to market relations. And if it does consider them, it is toward reducing allocations for social needs. And the government-proposed draft law on old-age and disability pensions is one more confirmation of that.

[Urmantsev] Now, if you do not object, let us turn to more general issues and, more precisely—to the Polish "shock therapy" experience. I have been in Poland for several days but this is entirely adequate to pay attention to the abundance of goods in the stores. It would seem that the goal has been achieved: lines and shortages have faded into the past and "shock therapy" has totally justified itself. But at the same time, according to sociological research data the press is reporting that only seven percent of Poles assess the economic situation in the country positively, 56 percent call it unstable, and 34 percent frankly perceive it as negative.

[Miodowicz] The market in Poland actually looks extremely attractive right now but only to the unsophisticated observer. I am talking about those people who judge the state of things by the store windows. Yes, lines have disappeared and there is no terrible ration system right now. But this has been primarily caused by the fact that prices for food and goods in our country are at the world level today and wages have remained at the old level. Prices are increasing and wages are being "muzzled" and they are practically frozen. Demand has dropped as a result. And the collectives of enterprises that produce goods for the market immediately felt that. Judge for yourself: consumption of food products alone has fallen more than 40 percent in Poland. As a result, surpluses have suddenly appeared in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, it has turned out that the customs control system has not been completely worked out. The market has been flooded with foreign goods which are frequently cheaper than our own domestic goods. Many enterprises that produce consumer goods are working for the warehouse. I already am not talking about those factories and plants that were exclusively oriented on the Soviet market. At the same time, contracts which were signed with the former GDR have been disrupted. All of this taken together has resulted in incredible difficulties and some enterprises have simply turned out to be bankrupt.

OPZZ is conducting its own investigation of the market using its own resources and is determining the minimum living wage level and consumer basket according to a different system than the government's. All of this is helping to determine specific actions for today and for the future to protect workers' interests. We are proceeding from the fact that trade union demands must be realized under the current difficult conditions via negotiations. Unfortunately, dialogues with the government have thus far not provided any results. And therefore we need to resort to such an extreme step as strikes.

[Urmantsev] A quite impressive wave of strikes and workers protests has spread throughout the country in recent months. We need to recall just the peasants' roadblock of the international highway. During the spring, they blocked the entrances to the buildings at the Ministry of Agriculture, Council of Ministers, and Belvederskiy Palace—the president of Poland's residence. The peasants demanded subsidies for production of agricultural products and cessation of their import from abroad. The railroad workers and the miners went on strike....

[Miodowicz] We are proceeding from the fact that strikes are not an OPZZ tactic. They are an act of despair by the workers' collectives who are thus compelled to attract attention to themselves and to seek the implementation of their legal rights. And we support valid strikes, for example, like the strike which occurred at the copper mines. The loss of the Soviet market is being keenly felt in this sector. Therefore, I want to especially stress: we need a well-thought out solution of the issue on reciprocal deliveries of products between our countries and on the preservation of trade relations even if at the former level. Trade unions can do a lot here. We recently discussed this with USSR VKP [All-Union Communist Party] Chairman V. Shcherbakov and agreed on a search for joint solutions.

[Urmantsev] And nevertheless, do Poland's trade unions, and first of all OPZZ, have their vision of the market, their alternative version?

[Miodowicz] We opposed "shock therapy" from the very beginning. It may ultimately turn out to be suicidal because the achievement of a positive effect at some stage will already be impossible under such extreme measures.

We have our own vision of the country's economic recovery. The productive activity of workers' collectives must be advanced as the top priority, not stagnation but development of the economy and not harsh taxation of state enterprises but benefits. This would result in increased wages, better functioning of production collectives and, despite the tax advantages, to new more substantial receipts in the state budget.

But what is occurring right now? State enterprises are in a tax vise. The level of production of products has already fallen by 40 percent and it continues to fall. Many factories and plants that have turned out to be not viable cannot even pay dismissed workers proper severance pay in accordance with the law. Privatization is still not providing a solution to economic stagnation. In our opinion, it must not be conducted at random but planned, based on the capital on hand, and must provide for the creation of new jobs. It is impossible to produce ever increasing numbers of unemployed workers without simultaneously planning the utilization of the released work force. Pay attention: there are nearly 1.5 million unemployed right now in Poland—this is 12 percent of the entire able-bodied population. This is twice the European-wide level!

But we are realists. Say, while demanding increased wages, we definitely consider the actual financial situation of enterprises and the sector as a whole.

[Urmantsev] Polish Prime Minister J. Bielecki stated not too long ago: "The strongest survive under conditions of a market economy." Do you agree with the way the question is posed?

[Miodowicz] Under no circumstances. This concerns only those people who want to scrap together capital under market conditions and to those who are ready to put up a sign and to begin to sell anything anywhere. But 90 percent of the population does not fit into this category. Do they not want to "survive" under market conditions? We advocate a free society in which democratic principles must operate, including social justice. Incidentally, the church, which you know is very influential in Poland, advocates this.

[Urmantsev] Have you expressed this point of view to the government and to the president?

[Miodowicz] We have met repeatedly with Mister L. Walesa and have discussed issues that I think are extremely important. Specifically, we agreed that the concept of a president's council would be developed for examination of the most acute and vital social issues. The president's council would consist of trade union and government representatives and employers.

[Urmantsev] Does it not seem to you that a paradoxical situation has been created in the labor movement in Poland: OPZZ has 5,000,000 people in its ranks and there are 2,000,000 in Solidarity? And nevertheless Solidarity is in power. Although, naturally, Solidarity has already ceased being a trade union as such....

[Miodowicz] That is it exactly. Extremely serious political figures rose from its ranks. It has split into several movements and parties. As for Solidarity's trade union direction, it has already closed its umbrella which it had held over the government prior to this and is now itself organizing acts of protest against the government's economic policy.

I want to note that cooperation and partnership between the OPZZ and Solidarity organizations has been established at the majority of enterprises. However, there are collectives, albeit in the minority, where confrontation is present for now. [Urmantsev] Your predictions for the future? What tasks do our countries' trade unions need to resolve?

[Miodowicz] In our country, as in yours, the thorough reconstruction of the economy and society has begun. Under these conditions, it is important to develop our own prediction of the development of events in order to, as much as possible, act ahead of time. I think that only in this way can we become the genuine protectors of those people who live by selling their labor. And if trade unions are late, other forces may replace them. Yes, the market requires self-denial. Yes, man must arm himself with long-suffering. But it is very important that this period of self- denial not be too long. Indeed, we should not delude ourselves. The transition stage to the market cannot be rapid. There are also many political figures in our country who have loudly promised that prosperity will arrive in six months or in two years. But, as you see, two years have already passed....

I am confident that we will emerge from this critical crisis. This requires the efforts of all society because there is no turning back.

Romanian-Soviet Territorial Dispute Viewed

91UF0932A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by K. Morozov (Bucharest-Moscow): "Embrace Them, Or Damn Them to Hell? The Problems of Bessarabia and Bukovina Could Complicate Our Relations with Romania"]

[Text] I have asked several Romanian colleagues why they do not like Russians. As a result, I have a whole collection of answers to use in composing a "history of Romanian-Soviet friendship."

"Do you know when the Russians first invaded Romania?" one person, for example, asked me. "In 1736! It is a good thing that Peter the Great lost the battle of the Prut to the Turks in 1711, or all of Moldova would have been under Russian control then!" Another person named the year of 1878, when the country threw off the Ottoman yoke during the Russo-Turkish war, which is called the "war of independence" in Romania. After the joint victory over the sultan, the tsar suddenly demanded southern Bessarabia from Romania, violating their agreement on border guarantees and threatening to "disarm the Romanian army" otherwise. The recent "comrades-in-arms" were on the brink of war, and that was when King Carol of Romania made the proud statement that many people here still quote with equal pride: "The Romanian army might be destroyed, but it will never be disarmed!" A third answer was extremely abrupt: "Why would we like you after the Red Army brought communism to Romania on its bayonets?!"

Nationalistic organizations have sprung up in Romania. The "Pro-Bessarabia and Bukovina" association, the "Bucharest-Kishinev" society, and others are demanding the return of the lost territories. Rallies "in

support of Moldova" are held constantly in Bucharest, and the demonstrators have delivered various memoranda to Soviet embassy personnel. The "Bucharest-Kishinev" society has called upon the population to enlist in "Moldovan aid detachments," which will cross the Prut in the event of clashes with the Gagauz and Russians "to bind the wounds of their fellow-countrymen." A speaker at a Civic Alliance rally suggested that the inhabitants of Moldova be granted Romanian citizenship as the first step in uniting this republic with Romania. It is no secret that the tension over the "Bessarabian question" is also being sustained by the People's Front of Moldova, certain members of which are frequent guests in Romania.

It was in this atmosphere that President I. Iliescu of Romania traveled to Moscow on 5 April to sign a new Soviet-Romanian treaty on cooperation, good-neighbor relations, and friendship, which immediately evoked a storm of accusations from the opposition. They asserted that the document would turn the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina into "hostages" of Romanian-Soviet relations because it stipulated the "inviolability of existing borders." In addition, they said that because each side had pledged not to join alliances hostile to the other side, this was a breach of the freedom to conclude alliances and a restoration of the "vassal" relationship between the two countries. The document's opponents said that Romania had "lost its dignity" by becoming the first of the East European countries to sign this kind of treaty with the USSR and declared that it had been signed in "suspicious haste." Some suggested that Iliescu was supposedly "paying the bill" for the KGB's organization of Ceausescu's overthrow and for the Soviet oil and gas that had been sent to Romania on credit. The president was criticized for not being firm enough in raising the issues of the disputed territories and gold reserve. One of the participants in an opposition roundtable discussion of the treaty even went so far as to say that Romania needs Soviet energy resources less than the USSR needs Romanian consumer goods. There was talk of "national betrayal" and appeals to the parliament not to ratify the treaty the president had signed.

Iliescu kept reiterating at numerous press conferences that good relations with all neighbors, especially the USSR, are in Romania's interest. Only irresponsible politicians could deny this obvious fact. The treaty with the USSR is an exceptionally positive document, conforming to the standards of international law. It is free of ideological and military commitments. Furthermore, it is not a "betrayal" of Bessarabia; on the contrary, the treaty envisages the possibility of direct ties between Moldova and Romania. The reference to the "inviolability of borders" is a precaution against attempts to change them by force, while the possibility of revising borders by mutual consent still exists—with Germany serving as the precedent. The agitators for reunification with Bessarabia are either consciously or unconsciously violating the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, which has the right to decide the matter. The treaty was not signed in haste. It began to be drafted when E. Shevardnadze visited Romania more than a year ago. There was only one time when the president apparently lost his temper and angrily asked: "What should we do? Declare war on the USSR?!"

Is it possible that the issue of the "disputed territories" will block the road to dialogue completely? In an effort to find out whether the bridges to understanding had been burned by these extremely militant statements, I went to what we would have described in the past as the "den of the enemy"—to the "Pro-Bessarabia and Bukovina" association. I had an appointment with Gheorghe Muntian, its first vice president, who said he was born in the village of Bilka in Bukovina, which is located right on the Soviet-Romanian border that has run through here since 1940. I began the interview with this question:

"Is it true that the main purpose of the association is to reunite the territories that are now part of the USSR with Romania?"

"We are not concealing our wish to recover Bessarabia and Bukovina," he answered with a smile, "but we are not sure how. Above all, we exclude the use of force. This would be counterproductive: After all, the historical experience of these provinces differs substantially from our own, and it would take us a long time to adapt to each other. The traditions, the customs, and even the language of the Bessarabians have changed. Fifty years of history cannot be thrown out with the garbage. For this reason, culture will have to be the main factor in this process of 'melting' the border between the two Romanian states. This is why we should be less concerned with borders than with broader communication with Bessarabia and Bukovina and, incidentally, with the whole Soviet Union."

"Not all of the association's leaders are as reasonable as you, and this makes me wonder if this is your own personal point of view or a common stance."

"The association went through a stage of what I regard as unnecessary politicizing, when many of its members would not stop at anything, so to speak. You see, good intentions and common sense are not always the same thing! I, for example, believe that the border on the Prut will cease to exist at some point. It is true that I do not know when this will happen, and I do not even care. I am a member of the moderate wing of our movement and I am against the endless rallies, processions, and religious services that are held for some reason or for no reason at all and are only depreciating the idea."

"How would you explain the unhealthy reaction to the conclusion of the Soviet-Romanian treaty?"

"This was a subjective reaction. Many of the people who are criticizing the treaty have not even read it. This is a habit left over from the days when Romanian-Soviet agreements were not completely trustworthy. I do not think that the present treaty is ideal, but I do think it is in the interest of both countries at this time. The

inviolability of borders does not mean their perpetuity. Borders have always been and will continue to be the topic of debates because they are conditional by their very nature. It is probable that only the borders of islands have been defined forever by nature.... The article about alliances? I do not think we would be happy if the USSR were to conclude an alliance with our opponent. This article has to be viewed from the standpoint of mutual interests."

"It seems to me that the need for good-neighbor relations and cooperation between the USSR and Romania is obvious and is dictated by geopolitical realities. This makes me wonder whether the radical associations are motivated by political ambition."

"Bessarabia and Bukovina have become the source of political capital for many people in Romania. Many events in support of Moldova are organized in the country without our knowledge, and we take no responsibility for them."

"Do you see a way out of the vicious cycle of reproaches and accusations that have taken the place of the spurious cordiality of our relations in the 'Ceausescu era'?"

"We have to get to know each other better, and then our views will become more flexible. Radicalism in politics, after all, is usually a result of dilettantism and a lack of knowledge and sophistication."

The voice of reason does hold out the hope that even the most complicated problems between our countries will be solved in time, but the ambitions of some political forces in Romania have already conflicted with the national interest several times in the country's "post-revolutionary" history. The rules of the political game are strict: The victor is the one who is not merely right, but has also been able to convince the majority that he is right, and this is not that simple. For this reason, when I asked Ambassador Vasile Sandru at a recent press conference in the Romanian Embassy in Moscow when the Soviet-Romanian treaty would be ratified, he had to admit that "the ratification date has not been set yet."

Bucharest Demonstration Over 'Occupied' Bessarabia

91UF0932B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 91 p 5

[Article by A. Timofeyev, TASS correspondent (Bucharest): "Late-Breaking News"]

[Text] The 51st anniversary of the "occupation of the territories of Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and the Herta region by the Soviet Union" was commemorated yesterday in Bucharest with a memorial protest rally. It was organized by the "For Bessarabia and Bukovina" association.

The demonstrators, who did not number more than 200, criticized the country's parliament "for the belated condemnation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and its effect on Romania" and the position of Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, who had proposed "a discreet policy of small steps in settling the issue of the return of the territories annexed by the Soviet Union in June 1940." They called this another maneuver by the government and parliament on the threshold of the ratification of the new Romanian-Soviet treaty on cooperation, goodneighbor relations, and friendship.

Protesters demanded the return of the "formerly Romanian territories." They resolved to issue an appeal to the president and government of Romania to speed up the resolution of the issue by creating an international commission to investigate the "occupation of the native lands." They also suggested that a "center for solidarity with Romanians from Bessarabia and Bukovina" be established on the former premises of the Romanian-Soviet Friendship Society.

Chilean Economic Revival Seen As Model For USSR

91UF0886A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jun 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by TASS correspondent A. Medvedenko: "The Chilean Phenomenon, Would Pinochet's Model of Economic Reform Prove Useful in the Soviet Union"]

[Text] Recently, USSR People's Deputy Viktor Alksnis discussing various economic models that, in his opinion, the Soviet Union could use as a point of reference remarked in his interview with BBC, "I am not an admirer of Pinochet's, but he did create a very effective economy. We can judge by what he succeeded in accomplishing. I am confident that we can use his example to help solve our own problems."

Alksnis is not alone in his hopes to use the esperience of the Chilean military men to normalize our economy. Recently, USSR People's Deputy M. Bocharov, as well as a number of prominent military leaders, made similar appeals. This model has "captured" the attention of members of the most diverse circles: journalists, political figures, even theatrical producers. Yu. A. Prokofyev, member of both the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo, who also serves as the First Secretary of the Moscow gorkom, is among those. While appearing at a press conference, he observed that the state should have an active and influential hand in the formation of our country's market, to which he added, "I wouldn't be afraid to go as far as mention Chile in this regard."

The Chilean economy has achieved some impressive successes in the last ten years. I worked in Chile at the end of the 60s, and later when the Chilean Popular Unity government was in power. I was also in Chile in January of last year. What I witnessed during my last visit was astonishing. The Chilean economy is on the upswing, and is one of the most stable economies in South America.

One would think using the Chilean example as a point of reference would hardly be reprehensible. The fact is, however, before we can arm ourselves with this new model, we must analyze it carefully, and decide whether it corresponds to our realities, and whether we can implement the same methods which have guided the Chileans in our own economy.

I am afraid that those advocating that we look closely at Chile are only considering one aspect of the "Chilean phenomenon." They think it was attained solely as a result of strong power; in this case a military dictatorship.

Even if one agrees with this line of thinking, one cannot ignore the price of this "phenomenon." Statistics published recently by a Chilean commission concerning the years prior to reconciliation leave no doubt on this account. During the period that the military was in power, 2,279 people were killed. Of that number, 164 fell

victim to brutality during demonstration breakups. In addition, 2,115 people died at the hands of security forces under various circumstances, 815 of whom were killed under torture, with another 975 disappearing without a trace after being arrested. Hundreds of thousands were also forced to emigrate in order to escape repression.

Are we ready to pay this kind of "price?"

It is a serious misconception, in my opinion, to think that Pinochet introduced order into the economy strictly by means of his dictatorship.

The problem lies in thinking, THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, that "Pinochet was the first dictator, right- or leftwing, to introduce an open economy. His free-market policy was well-founded, and it worked. The Chilean business atmosphere is dynamic and productive. The country's infrastructure, from the metro system to air and sea transport, the mining industry, finances, and production, is the most efficient in Latin America."

One can hardly disagree with a reputable American newspaper. Nonetheless, allow me to make one observation. The fact is, Pinochet did not introduce an open or market economy in Chile. It existed long before he came to power, as did the institution at its foundation; private ownership.

Chile has traditionally been a country of artisans and small and average-size entrepreneur; They formed the basis of the national economy. Therefore, it was no coincidence that, after coming to power, Pinochet began paying them very close attention. His military regime did not have major problems associated with denationalization, or as we say now, destatizahon [ragosudarstvlenivel. Although this may only have been because the Chilean Popular Unity nationalized the overwhelming majority of companies and enterprises (350 in all), their return to the bosom of the private sector, which began immediately after the overthrow, went relatively smoothly. There was no need for the military authorities to conduct a referendum to determine public sentiment toward private ownership, because most of the country's land resources were already in the hands of private owners. Also, the rash, and at times provocational actions of radical supporters of the Popular Unity, who had carried out a violent seizure of land under the guise of expropriation, had only soured public opinion toward collectivized ownership.

Pinochet's real accomplishment was that he reduced government interference in the economy to a minimum, which is chiefly what Allende's government had tried to do, he also separated the economy from politics and deideologized economics.

By dissolving the National Congress and all existing political parties without exception, (including the National Party, which had implicitly supported the potschists), and by disbanding social organizations and trade unions, and prohibiting strikes and other forms of

social protest, the military regime on one hand denied the Chilean citizens the opportunity to be politically active, on the other hand, having entrusted highly qualified economists with the management of economic affairs, the military regime managed somehow to take the economy out from under state control.

In addition, the Chilean economic development model was not developed by national economists (although Chilean economists are in high demand both on the continent and abroad). Its authors were actually representatives of the so-called Chicago school headed by Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, (who, in our press, has been the object of more than just a little venomous criticism). Pinochet's decision to invite foreign economists to come to Chile was based purely on pragmatic reasoning. In his view, the "Friedman boys," who had no vested interest in any particular firm, business, or sector of the Chilean economy, would be able to resolve the task at hand in an unbiased manner. They would therefore, come up with a more objective model that would better serve the interests of the entire economy.

Chile is a compact country that could be managed from the center without any real difficulty. Nonetheless, the military regime opted for decentralization. Every region, within reasonable limits, was granted managerial and economic independence. They operated without unnecessary interference from the central government essentially autonomously.

It is important to mention that the Chilean economy almost immediately geared itself toward export, even though it was at the expense of domestic interests. In addition, the country set two goals for itself. It pursued a course of earning hard currency in order to pay off its foreign debt, and it strove to produce high quality goods capable of competing on the international market. As a result of the latter, the country not only brought its own technology and industry up to the world level, but created and developed whole new sectors such as electronics.

Of course, this is only a sketchy outline of the Chilean economic development model. It does not include all of its features, such as increased foreign capital investment, which the regime made possible by creating an atmosphere highly favorable for foreign investors (who were also attracted by the country's stable political situation, and by a feeling of confidence in the fate of their investments.) Chile also created conditions for the operation of monopolies. (By the end of 1989, 24 large companies had branches in operation in Chile.)

The factors enumerated above work interdependently. And it is namely these factors, and not the authoritarian government, personified by Pinochet and his military regime, which predetermined the appearance of the "Chilean phenomenon."

The examples provided by both Argentina and Uruguay, which neighbor with Chile, support this notion.

Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile have much in common. In all three countries military regimes came to power at approximately the same time, (in Uruguay in June, Chile in September of 1973, and in Argentina, in March of 1976). The number of years each regime remained "at the helm" is also comparable. However, unlike Chile, the military regimes in Argentina and Uruguay both showed that they were incapable of straightening out their economies, and were forced out of power.

The latter signifies that economic improvements are not so much a result of an "authoritarian government," be it even a military dictatorship, but of the economic policy which it pursues.

Also, one cannot disregard the other side of the "Chilean phenomenon," which many of its advocates, for some reason, forget. The military regime's economic policy gave rise to serious social inequality and stratification in Chilean society.

In March of last year, a constitutional government headed by President Patricio Aylwin came to power. The new government faces the crucial task of proving that successful economic development is also entirely possible under democratic conditions.

Korean Academic Views USSR-ROK Ties, Soviet Influence on DPRK

91UF0931A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 91 p 3

[Interview with No Kon-Su, professor of history at Stanford University, by correspondent Mikhail Morozov: "Fly, 'Boeings,' Fly"]

[Text] Doctor No Kon-Su is 37. He is Korean and was born in Seoul. After attending school in several countries, where No moved with his father, a diplomat, he was awarded a bachelor's degree at Harvard University. Then he served in the Korean Army. After demobilization, he studied Eastern European politics at Oxford University and defended a doctoral dissertation. Now Doctor No Kon-Su teaches history at Stanford University.

Our correspondent Mikhail Morozov discussed Soviet-South Korean relations with Professor No Kon-Su.

[Morozov] It has been almost 3 years since the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea began their rapprochement at the Seoul Olympics. Soon it will be a year since full diplomatic relations were established between our countries. How would you, as a young and independent scholar, assess the present state of our relations?

[No] After 40 years of alienation our countries and our people began a new chapter of cooperation, and I was happy about this. The cold war stifled realistic impulses and destroyed good opportunities for our cooperation, in the same way that it did this in international relations in general. During the brief period since the time when contacts were established, an excellent foundation has been laid for mutually beneficial cooperation. Our economic relations have been as dynamic as our political relations.

[Morozov] I would prefer to reinforce these feelings by not bringing up the topic of the Korean Boeing that was shot down, but I will take the risk of asking how you feel about this.

[No] The most tragic thing about the "KAL-007 incident" was the loss of human lives and the grief of the families that will never see their loved ones again. This terrible tragedy must be seen as a lesson in the lengths to which people would go in the grip of the paranoid suspicions of the cold war.

The problem can only be solved by reviewing the facts carefully and conscientiously, without politicizing them. Whatever the results of the investigation might be, they will not compensate for the pain of the families that lost loved ones. We have a moral obligation to the victims to develop our relations on the basis of constant friendship.

[Morozov] Our country is going through a painful period of political and economic reform. You have been in many states—developed and otherwise. How would you assess the present situation in the USSR?

[No] There is a Korean saying which would sound something like this in Russian: "After you command your horse to gallop, you have to watch out for hills and valleys." My few trips to your country do not allow me to make competent judgments.

I am thoroughly amazed by the patience of the Soviet people and the self-restraint they have displayed in this time of unrest and uncertainty. It is completely natural to want immediate improvement, especially when the conditions of life reach the critical point. I feel it is also important to remember, however, that hasty decisions could give rise to new unexpected problems. The management of economic development and democratic reform is an extremely complex process. Not many countries have been able to avoid difficulties along the way. Even my country, with its reputation for successful reform, is still encountering new obstacles.

[Morozov] What can you say about the economic relations between our countries? Will they retain the earlier tendency toward development? What are people in Korea saying about the 3 billion in credit?

[No] I think there are good prospects for our economic relations, primarily because of the intersupplementary nature of the two economies, but the realization of full potential will take time, and this will depend largely on changes in your country. I think that as soon as the domestic situation in the USSR clears up, cooperation will be developed more quickly.

Three billion dollars is not a small sum for our mediumsized economy. The decision to extend this big loan was made by President Roh Tae Woo not only because of his personal commitment to the reforms in the Soviet Union, but also as an expression of the goodwill of all the Korean people. Of course, because we are not as rich as, for instance, Japan, some people in our country are saying that the money could have been used to give the Korean people a higher standard of living, but there is not a single person in Korea who objects to the development of friendly relations with the USSR.

[Morozov] What kind of difficulties do you see in the development of economic relations between our countries?

[No] Problems are inevitable in any economic relationship. Difficulties occasionally arise in our relations as well. They are due to such ordinary things as customs policy, bureaucratic complications, and different interpretations of specific matters. The biggest difficulties arise because many of our businessmen overestimate the possible profits of projects and underestimate the political difficulties they might have in the USSR. They often do not know how to overcome problems connected with the underdeveloped infrastructure. Most of the laws regulating the activities of foreign firms and joint ventures in your country were passed in the last few years. Regrettably, many of these documents are inconsistent and are not keeping up with the changes in your country. Besides this, there are problems connected with the

existence of two governments—central and republic. Which one's laws will apply to economic ties with foreign partners in the future? Korean businessmen will trust you more when questions like this one have been cleared up.

[Morozov] It seems to me that the euphoria over economic cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Korea is subsiding in our country and in yours. What is your opinion?

[No] Yes, to some extent I agree, but we must remember that the boom aroused the interest not only of serious individuals, but also of many who were simply curious and some who were too optimistic from the very beginning. I think all of this is an understandable reaction for the USSR and the Republic of Korea, which were effectively non-existent for one another for 40 years. The really important thing is that our leading firms are continuing and expanding their operations in the USSR. Hyundai, Samsung, Goldstar, the Korean Deep-Sea Fishing Company, and others are actively investing money and planning the formation of joint ventures in the USSR.

[Morozov] In spite of its problems, the USSR is still one of the leading world powers. What do you think our country could contribute to the development of the Asia-Pacific zone and the resolution of the Korean problem?

[No] There is no question that the USSR is still a superpower. The Soviet Union is still a colossal power in the military-strategic sense, but among the other components of your national strength, the most valuable, in my opinion, is your colossal human resources. When the

energy of your people finds an effective outlet, you will have new sources of national strength. Then the integration of the USSR into the regional process of economic development will be possible.

The USSR has ties with both parts of Korea. This gives you a unique opportunity to play the role of a trustworthy intermediary and assist in the achievement of mutual understanding and unification. I think the best way for the USSR to exert pressure on North Korea is to set an example of successful political and economic reform and rejoin the world community. The extreme isolation of North Korea and the potential instability of this country are of no benefit to the region. Only extremists could want chaotic upheavals in the northern part of the Korean peninsula. Chaos in North Korea would result in terrible human losses and would not promote peaceful unification. Unification can only be accomplished in an atmosphere of mutual trust, following the resolution of the problems that will arise during the integration of the two different social systems.

The Korean people are victims of the postwar order in Asia and of the cold war which was going on all those years. In the last 45 years we have not been able to break down the barriers of mistrust between us. We all hope that the leadership of North Korea will acknowledge the new realities. Friction between brothers cannot be of any benefit and can only postpone the opportunities cooperation offers. I believe that realistic views will prevail in the dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang. And whereas the division of Korea is a symbol of the cold war in Asia, peaceful unification will be a sign of the beginning of a new and more constructive period in the life of the region.

Gerasimov Interviewed on Arab Affairs, Peace Process

91AA0444Z London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 14 Jun 91 p 8

[Interviw with Soviet ambassador to Portugal Gennadiy Gerasimov, place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has rejected an American plan for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. He has insisted on not giving any role to the United Nations and on convening only one joint meeting, after which negotiations would take place in bilateral meetings. He has also demanded the right to veto any Palestinian delegation which he does not help select. What is your opinion on Mr. Shamir's conditions?

[Gerasimov] They are negative positions regarding the United Nations' role. First of all, it was a UN resolution that established his state, the state of Israel, and his idea of the international conference being initially an open conference and then becoming closed sessions does not pass for the idea of a conference. Rather, it transforms it into a one-day review. In my opinion, the main problem is that the Shamir government does not at all desire a conference. It believes that time is working to Israel's advantage, and it believes that the establishment of difficult conditions and impediments will succeed in making the world refuse to have anything to do with efforts to convene a conference.

This is my reading of the situation, and I do not believe that it is optimistic.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Do you believe that time is actually working in favor of the Israeli Government?

[Gerasimov] They believe so now, because the Arab countries are suffering from problems, especially regarding the position or attitude of each one on the conference. These Arab disagreements help Shamir.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What would the Soviet Union's position be if Prime Minister Shamir refuses to attend any peace conference?

[Gerasimov] The Soviet Union supports the idea of convening a conference. As is well-known, the Soviet Union and the United States would have auspices over this conference. We will continue to employ every diplomatic means in our power to put additional pressure on Israel to agree to a conference and to respect UN resolutions 242 and 338.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Which pressures will you apply?

[Gerasimov] They are matters that will be applied in the diplomatic sphere. For example, we currently do not have full diplomatic relations with Israel. It desires diplomatic relations, but we refuse. This refusal can be

classified as diplomatic pressure, because we maintain that we favor the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel only when we begin the peace process.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Are the Arabs expecting you to exert pressure regarding the construction of settlements in the occupied territories?

[Gerasimov] We are applying many pressures.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] David Levy, the Israeli foreign minister, stated that all of the discussions taking place between them and the Americans aim to strengthen cooperation between Israel and the United States. If that is the case, how can the region obtain a just peace?

[Gerasimov] I stated that the Shamir government does not desire a conference. However, a just peace can be achieved, as the Soviet Union proposes, by convening a peace conference in which all of the Arab countries and the Palestinians participate.

Of course, there are other ideas for establishing peace in the region, including President Bush's plan to destroy all chemical and nuclear weapons in the Middle East. There are other plans to prevent the export of arms in general to the region. However, the conference remains the basis for reaching peace.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] The Soviet Union has so far not agreed to join Britain, France, America, and China in a conference that is expected to convene next month in Paris to discuss limiting the sale of arms to the Middle East region. Is that because Moscow requires hard currency, which is generated by arms sales?

[Gerasimov] I do not know the reason. However, I do know that we support the principle of negotiations to limit arms sales to every place in the world, especially the Middle East.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] In your opinion, why does Shamir reject the exchange of land for peace?

[Gerasimov] Ask him. I have already answered this question. Shamir is playing for time, and he believes that time is on his side. That is my explanation of his behavior.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What would happen if the initiative of American Secretary of State James Baker fails and all of the promises of peace following the Gulf war become a mere illusion?

[Gerasimov] Fine, we will continue the same line all the way. We must continue through diplomatic efforts.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] By continuing, will the process remain alive?

[Gerasimov] Yes, because we must keep the peace process alive. We must not allow it to die. Or, as they say in Israel, we must keep the pot boiling.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Is there a joint Soviet-American initiative on the horizon for the peace process?

[Gerasimov] The peace conference about which we spoke is a joint initiative. It is under the auspices of the two countries. The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed that, when the sessions of this conference begin, we will regularly examine the progress of the conference. Hence, that is our role. It is a type of duty and commitment.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] But what will the goal of the conference be? Is not everyone discussing only the form of the negotiations and the formation of delegations?

[Gerasimov] Important points are now being discussed—the continuity of the conference, disagreements between Israel and the other countries, the United Nation's participation. These are important topics. However, Israel is stubborn and is not moving one step further on these matters, because it wants to torpedo the conference in general. It does not want a conference.

I talk with some Israeli officials. They talk about continuity, about a single session, or about a number of sessions. However, in actuality, they do not want a conference at all.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Does their rejection of a conference mean that they do not want peace?

[Gerasimov] What more can I add after telling you that they believe that time is on their side?

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] When King Husayn called for transcending the taboos that have prevented Arabs and Israelis from talking to each other, Minister Ari'el Sharon stated that he would invite King Husayn to drink a cup of coffee with him and would then tell him: You are no longer the king of Jordan, because Jordan is Palestine. How do you explain this Israeli reaction?

[Gerasimov] It is an old story. They have been repeating it for a long time. However, who would accept Jordan becoming Palestine? The Soviet Union would not agree. We have a Palestinian embassy in Moscow. We also have a Jordanian embassy. They are two different embassies.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Why, in your opinion, does Israel reject a role for the PLO in the peace process?

[Gerasimov] Because it wants to demonstrate that the Palestinians do not exist. It wants to misconstrue reality by stating that they are Jordanians. However, Israel is contradicting itself, because the policy of suppression which it pursues, and which led to the uprising, has helped the Palestinians enrich their national identity.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Let us now move to the situation in the Soviet Union. How can the Arab countries help the Soviet Union move beyond its economic crisis?

[Gerasimov] To my knowledge, we have loans from Kuwait that are from before the war. That is all I know. My presence in Lisbon has left me unprepared to know how the Arab countries can help.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Several observers have said that the West will listen to President Gorbachev, but will provide aid and support to Boris Yeltsin. Have you heard this?

[Gerasimov] Not at all. Moreover, I heard something different. What I heard is that, officially, the leaders of the Western countries support perestroyka, and the leader of perestroyka is President Gorbachev. They support him and they will support him.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, stated that the Soviet Union is on the brink of chaos, and that the West's reluctance to support President Gorbachev will lead to a dictatorship. Is this a Soviet threat?

[Gerasimov] It is Mr. Shevardnadze's description of the situation. I can add that it is in the interest of other countries in the West that the Soviet Union be stable. The Soviet Union is a very large country. If chaos spreads in it, the world would be adversely affected. Therefore, it is better for the West to help by investing in the Soviet Union, because that would be in its security interests.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] The West feels that President Gorbachev has not ridden himself of the "three ugly sisters," in other words, the Red Army, the KGB, and the Communist Party. What is your comment on that?

[Gerasimov] My response is the following: The Communist Party is now one among other parties present in the Soviet Union, because our system has become a multiparty system. For example, tomorrow (Wednesday), elections will be held to elect the president of Russia. There are six candidates competing for a single position. Therefore, this is the response to question of the party.

As for the army, it is an institution that exists in every country of the world. Regarding the intelligence apparatus, I maintain that, in the imperfect world in which we live inside the Soviet republics, it is a necessary apparatus. Every government has its intelligence apparatus. All republics have a different security apparatus. We have adopted a new law regarding the state security committee. The new law determines the authorities and responsibility of the intelligence service under Soviet laws. As I said, every country in the world has its intelligence apparatus.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Will the summit conference between President Gorbachev and President Bush be held before the convocation of the conference of the seven industrialized nations?

[Gerasimov] I do not know, because the American secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister, during their meetings in Geneva to discuss limiting nuclear and strategic arms, encountered several problems requiring a solution. Overcoming and solving all of the problems is one of the conditions for a summit conference, because the two presidents wish to sign a treaty. Therefore, its convocation was postponed. However, until when, I truly do not know.

Husayn Regime Measured Against Possible Alternatives

91UF0973B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by D. Kulik: "Does Saddam Suit Everyone? The Anti-Iraq Coalition Does not Need either a Civil War in Iraq or a Strong new Leader in Baghdad, but only Saddam Husayn"]

[Text] Immediately after the war in the Persian Gulf, world society's attention was riveted on the fate of the repressed Kurdish refugees for a long time. Now—if only partially—this problem has been resolved but nevertheless a complicated situation remains in Iraq: a large part of the enterprises, communications, and housing have been destroyed as a result of the military operations. And the main thing—an enormous number of people have died (according to some data, their number totals 40,000), many wounded people remain without shelter, and 64,000 Iraqi soldiers and officers had been prisoners until recently.

Saddam Husayn has employed a perfected technique and increased repression to maintain the status quo. The Iraqis have been frightened to the limit. As my Western colleagues describe it, it is impossible to start a conversation with local residents on the streets of Baghdad and they are even afraid to approach Europeans since they foresee unpleasant consequences for their families.

However, no change in this situation is expected in the foreseeable future. And one of the reasons why this does not seem to be unexpected is that Saddam Husayn... suits the majority of the conflict's participants.

The epic work with the inspections of nuclear facilities by UN experts is graphic evidence of this. In recent days, threats resound from Washington to Iraq in connection with the fact that the Baghdad regime is aggressively opposing the international commission's work which is verifying the locations where weapons of mass destruction depots or plants where they are manufactured are possibly located. Several days ago, UN inspectors were not allowed access to a facility and, two days later, when the Iraqi authorities then invited them to visit the facility, there was only the desert at this location. At another facility that is strategically important for Iraq, guards simply fired in the air when the foreigners appeared. We think that previously such actions would have caused not only a storm of protest but also demands for the removal of Saddam Husayn himself. However, this is not occurring. Is it not strange that the current Iraqi dictator with a weakened army and economy and, of course, without nuclear and chemical weapons, suits the Americans. The meeting which occurred between UN Security Council members and the Iraqi delegation was conducted in a cordial and businesslike atmosphere. They only attempted to resolve the issue on inspections of strategic facilities and, in so doing, did not touch on the problem of eliminating the dictatorship in Iraq—the problem which was discussed on the front pages of the entire world's newspapers. Why is this occurring?

If the Iraqi dictator leaves of his own accord or if they "make him leave," then one can suggest two possible variations of the development of events. First, a Lebanon-type civil war is possible when destruction and anarchy are present in the country and when the territory is divided into zones of influence of various parties and religions (at that, some sort of external force always stands behind each one of them). In this case, the crisis will be dragged out even more and a peaceful resolution will become practically impossible.

If events develop along the second path, it has not been excluded that a strong leader will come to power in Baghdad who will conduct democratic reforms, do everything possible to strengthen the country, and restore the economy and the army. In this case, Iraq will once again become a strong Middle East power which will probably once again pretend to the role of unifier of the Arab World.

By the way, some Western Middle East experts think that both of these variations equally cannot please either the United States or its allies because the situation will then become unpredictable for them.

So, if you recall the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, you can see that they have already encountered the first variation in the small state of Lebanon. Washington has always attempted to subordinate this Arab country to its own interests.

In Lebanon, the Americans used not only political methods but, when matters went poorly for them, also military. In 1958, a U.S. 6th Fleet 17,000 man amphibious assault force landed on a picturesque Beirut beach. This was done in order to retain C. Chamoun, who conducted an openly pro-American policy, for a second presidential term. But, despite the fact that the strength of the Marines was twice the strength of the Lebanese Army and patriotic forces, they had to leave Lebanon in disgrace without attaining their goals.

Unfortunately, the United States, which had previously rejected a political solution to the crisis, did not want to consider the sad experience of its military intervention and once again used military intervention in the Persian Gulf. Obviously right now the experts in Washington have finally made an excursion into the history of their policy in the Middle East. And that is probably why the United States has gradually rejected military pressure. A graphic example of this—is the subsequent replacement of their own troops with UN armed forces and the inspection of nuclear and chemical facilities, once again using this organization.

In the event of the "elimination" of Iraq, the situation in this country will be just as unpleasant for the United States as the situation in Lebanon was at one time. We recall that 60 percent of the state's population are Shiites, some of whom are under the influence of Islamic fundamentalists who oppose not only Saddam Husayn but also, right after Iran, oppose the Americans. Their assumption of power in the event of a civil war threatens to not only weaken the position of the United States and its Western European allies in this portion of a strategically important region but also poses a direct threat to neighboring Arab countries. This significantly affects neighboring Syria whose interests contradict the spread of the Islamic Revolution on its territory which will be an inevitable result of a fanatic Shiite elite coming to power. Turkey, for its own reasons, is not interested in a civil war which, in the event of the defeat of the Kurds during a possible civil war, would compel Turkey to accept them under her roof (when 10 million Turkish Kurds already live in that country).

From time to time serious tensions arise between Ankara and the Kurdish movement. An exchange of gunfire between members of the banned Kurdish Workers' Party of Turkey and state security forces became the latest clash. Four people died as a result. Altogether 3,000 people have died since 1984, that is, since the beginning of this Marxist party's struggle for Kurdish independence. As you can see, Turkey also has enormous problems and the instability of the situation in Iraq is unfavorable for Turkey.

As for the second variation, it is clear to everyone that it is not advantageous for either the United States or its main ally in the region—Israel—to have a strong Iraq, even with a democratic government, which can nevertheless, even if not on the former scale, become one of the leading Arab powers. Meanwhile, it has not been excluded that members of the Party of Arab Socialist Revival, who pretend to the role of a Pan-Arab party, will govern the country and, regardless of whether Saddam Husayn heads it or not, they do not plan to give up their positions. They will certainly attempt to take revenge for the defeat in the Persian Gulf War. Therefore, the Arab participants of the anti-Iraq coalition also fear the strengthening of Iraq.

The USSR, for its part, is interested in Iraq as a single, stable partner and in the continuation of cooperation, indeed, already not from the underlying ideological cause but on a mutually advantageous basis. All of this will not occur in the event of instability in the country.

So, a paradoxical situation has taken shape when the enemies of Saddam Husayn's regime, who are calling for his removal, who have previously demanded his physical elimination, and who are concerned about the rebels who have once again raised their heads in southern Iraq, are actually interested in maintaining the current situation in this long-suffering country.

Pakistani Charge D'Affaires in Moscow Interviewed

91UF0973A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 91 p 4

[Interview with Pakistani Interim Charge D'Affaires to USSR Faruq Rana by Konstantin Eggert, no date given: "Pakistan Is not Striving to Become a Nuclear Power—Stated Islamic Republic of Pakistan Interim Charge D'Affaires Doctor Faruq Rana in an Interview for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA"]

[Text] Asia

[Eggert] What are the prospects for Soviet-Pakistani relations?

[Rana] We think that right now, when the political and ideological confrontation between our states is giving way to cooperation, we must not lose the opportunity to establish a durable system of economic ties. Pakistan and the USSR have something to offer each other. Broad prospects exist for creation of joint ventures, especially in the sphere of the cotton processing industry and the manufacture of cloth and clothing. Central Asian cotton is the best in the world and Pakistan has traditionally been famous for its textile industry. I think that our entrepreneurs are prepared to offer their technology and experience to Soviet partners. Yes and the Soviet market is undoubtedly interested in the products of Pakistani light industry. In turn, we are interested in your experience in the construction of energy industry facilities.

[Eggert] Does hope exist for the release of Soviet prisoners of war who are in the hands of the Afghan opposition?

[Rana] The Pakistani government is approaching this as a purely humanitarian problem and is applying all efforts for its resolution. We all know that last year we managed to obtain the release of two prisoners of war through the personal mediation of Benazir Bhutto. However, we should not exaggerate the Pakistani leadership's capabilities on this issue. First of all, our influence on the Mujaheddin is extremely limited. Second, the fact that all prisoners of war are on the territory of Afghanistan itself is a universally recognized fact. Third, they have ended up in the hands of various opposition groups who frequently put forward different demands. All of this complicates the release of Soviet prisoners of war. It would undoubtedly be easier to solve this problem if the Afghan crisis was actually about to emerge from the impasse.

[Eggert] What is Pakistan's position on the issue of settling this conflict which unfortunately has already been going on for more than 10 years?

[Rana] Our country is more interested than anyone else in the settlement of the conflict. There are 3,000,000 Afghan refugees on Pakistani territory and this creates additional social and economic problems of which there are already many. The Afghans—are patriots and they

undoubtedly long to return but this is possible only under the condition of a lasting civilian peace in the country. To do this, free nationwide elections need to be conducted under the control of an interim administration. Former King Muhammed Zahir-shah, who lives in Italy, could head it. He is capable of becoming the symbol of national reconciliation and consolidation because he did not participate in the events of the last decade. But he will not agree to return while Najibullah is in power.

We proceed from the fact that Najib must vacate the post of president and participate in elections on an equal footing with the other candidates. If he is really popular, he has nothing to fear, all the more so since the opposition is divided and has still not arrived at unity. Otherwise, being the president, Najibullah will have the capability to influence the outcome of the elections while having the army, the security organs, and the press at his disposal. And at the present time he is not the legally and nationally elected head of state. This is precisely why the Pakistani government has not recognized either the Najibullah regime or the interim government of Gulbuddin Hekmatiar because we do not think that either of them represents the Afghan people. It remains to be hoped that in the near future Afghanistan will finally acquire a legitimate government with which our country can do business.

[Eggert] Recently, much has been said about Soviet aid to the regime in Kabul and about American aid to the Mujaheddin. What can you say on this score?

[Rana] I think that the main thing here is the size of the deliveries. You spent \$60 billion on the war in Afghanistan. I did not invent this figure. Mr. Shevardnadze, a

man who is worthy of trust in all respects, gave me this figure. But even today your country renders the Najibullah government \$300 million worth of aid every month. I obtained these facts from official Soviet documents and the press. It is not only a question of military aid.

Do you know where in the world it is easiest to purchase Soviet consumer goods? I will tell you: in Peshawar. The USSR provides a mass of products to Afghanistan and from there black market dealers forward them to Pakistan through areas controlled by the Mujaheddin. You will agree that this is a paradox, especially in light of the current economic situation in the Soviet Union. Naturally, the United States also helps the opposition but on an entirely different scale. Of course, we also need to solve this problem.

[Eggert] Pakistan is often accused of being reluctant to accede to the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and of creating its own atomic bomb....

[Rana] That is incorrect. My country is not striving to become a nuclear power—this is an enormous load on a state's economy. We have more than enough problems. Pakistan is prepared to sign this treaty if India does the same thing. For the time being, Delhi has not shown any desire to accede to the international pact and moreover has rejected all of Pakistan's proposals about the conclusion of bilateral agreements. This is also understandable: India had already tested a nuclear device in 1974 and right now, according to Western data, has from 80 to 90 nuclear warheads.

[Eggert] And Pakistan?

[Rana] According to foreign assessments—five or six.

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